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CHAPl'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human freedom or the lack of it is a subject of great interest. 
Socially and politically the quest for freedom has highlighted our 
news for years. Freedom marches may gain some measure of social 
equality for oppressed minorities, independence granted to subject 
nations may mark the advent of political freedom, but still the search 
for freedom wil.1 go on. New moralities may be promulgated, new 
liberties expressed in fashions, nevertheless man's hunger for freedom 
will not be satisfied. We live in an age of collectivism, of big 
business and big labor. In this time the "solitary individual" is· 
seeking identity and meaning for life. For this reason and to this 
end man thirsts for freedom. 
Ultimately freedom is a spiritual concept. Our Lord said, "If 
you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples, and you will 
1 
know the truth and the truth will make you free." Saint Paul under-
scores the freedom that comes to the follower of Christ in the words, 
"There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ 
Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me 
free from the law of sin and death. "2 This freedom is of a different 
nature from the freedom so ardently sought at'ter today, but ultimately 
1John 8:3lb, 32. R.s.v. 
2Romans 8:1,2. R.S.V~ 
2 
all true and lasting freedom is grounded in this freedom. 
Such an assertion needs authentication. This is the purpose of 
this paper. This study will focus on the concept of "free will" as 
it is fornrulated in the Lutheran Confessions and expressed by 
S~ren Kierkegaard in selected writings • . 
We make this comparison in the light of recent developments in 
Protestant theology. This new movement has been called "Neo-Orthodoxy" 
or "crisis" theology and has received much of its impetus from the 
writings of Karl Barth. Many acknowledge that Kierkegaard is ultimately 
the spiritual "father" of this theology. Kierkegaard is also cited as 
the source of existentialism. Smith asserts: "There can be no doubt that 
the ultimate source of existentialism, especially in its religious and 
theological aspect, is S~ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) • t13 
Since Kierkegaard was a Danish Lutheran one might logically expect 
to find affinities between his thought and that of our Lutheran 
Confessions. But since the Lutheran Confessions were available long 
before Kierkegaard why has he had such an impact on modern theological 
thought? Is Kierkegaard's theology different or is it expr~~~ed 
differently? These questions .pose the. r~ason for this study~ 
.. ~ ... • • ' J • 
The Scope of this Study 
This · paper will attempt to survey and examine the concept of free 
. ··: 
will in the Lutheran Confessions and in selected Kierkegaard writings. 
3John E. Smith and Others, A Handbook of Christian Theology (New 
York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 120, 121. . .. 
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Ancillary categories such as original sin will likewise have to be 
explored so that free will is seen in its true perspective. Faith 
will receive brief treatment to show the subordinate position of the 
concept of free wi11 in both the Lutheran Confessions and in Kierkegaard. 
Wherever equitable similar categories will be used to examine the 
position of the Lutheran Confessions and of S~ren Kierkegaard. Since 
this cannot be done completely, the first category considered in 
examining each position will be the point of view. 
A limiting factor in this study are the resources available to 
this writer. The fo11owing works will serve as basic resources for 
this paper: The Book of Concord edited by Theodore G. Tappert_will 
be the basis for the study in the Confessions. Schlink's Theology of 
the Lutheran Confessions will also be used in the Confessional segment 
of this paper. In examining Kierkegaard's works, The Concept of Dread 
and The Sickness unto Death are cited mo~t frequently •. In interpreting 
Kierkegaard's ~osition Thomte's Kierkegaard''s Philosophy of Religion 
and Heinecken's The Moment Before God play the most prominent ·role 
although other works are cited. For purposes of general ·overview and 
perspective. Pelikan's From Luther to Kierkegaard and Martin's ·The Wings 
of Faith have been used. 
The Method of this Study 
Our approach to the concept of free will in the Confessions and 
selected Kierk~gaard writings will be first to examine the positions. 
A brief attempt will be made to understand the position taken in.the 
4 
light of the historical. context. Hence introductory background material. ·1 
will be cited to establish the circumstances pertinent to the position 
taken by either the Lutheran Confessions or Kierkegaard. 
Following the examination of each position an attempt will be made 
at comparison. Similarities and differences will be noted. The signi-
ficance of the similarities as well as the differences will be the subject 
of the final chapters of this study. 
I know of no other study in this area, but this does not mean that 
such studies do not exist. If parallel studies are available at the 
Seminary library, they should be read as a control on this paper. 
The Objectives of this Study 
The primary objective of this paper irlll be the comparison of the 
Lutheran Confessional position on human freedom with the position of 
S~ren Kierkegaard. In the light of the comparison similarities and 
differences may be brought out for evaluation. The deeper appreciation 
of the Lutheran Confessional position with regard to free will as well 
as Kierkegaard's position should result from this study. 
There ought to be some b~-products of this study. Perhaps a better 
grasp of the direction of modern Protestant theology might be one. 
Hopefully, there will be some implications for systematic theology as a 
result of this survey. Perhaps there may be even a suggestion for 
improving the Seminary curriculum in systematic theology. 
Finally, we will discover the answer to the question mentioned 
previously: Is Kierkegaard's theology different or does he express it 
5 
differently? From the answer we receive we might be moved to examine 
current Lutheran theological fonnulations. We might even be challenged 
to utilize a different methodology for expressing theological convic-
tions. 
A Personal Reason for this Study 
I must here acknowledge my debt to S~ren Kierkegaard who brought 
theo~ogy back to life for me. The arid deserts of Aristotelian categories 
in which our systematic theology was framed had nearly convinced me that 
theology was merely a matter of comprehending and applying certain formulae. 
It was and is Kierkegaard's gi~ to me that he led me to see Christianiiy 
in terms of existence. In his own dynamic way he demonstrated to me 
that theology included the "how" of life as well. as the "what" of l.ife. 
Thus thi.s pilgrimage into· the Lutheran Confessions and Kierkegaard was 
. . 
for me both necessary and rewarding. 
CHAPl'ER Il 
FREE WILL Ii"i THE LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS 
Man, the Creature 
So it is not irreligious, idle, or superfluous, but in the 
highest degree wholesome and necessary, for a Christian to 
know whether or not his will has anything to do in matters 
~ertaining to salvation. Indeed, let me tell you, this is 
the hinge on which our discussion turns, the crucial issue 
between us; our aim is, simply, to investigate what ability 
'free-will' has, in what respect it is the subject of 
Divine action and how it stands related to the grace of God. 
If we know nothing of these things, we shall know nothing 
whatsoever of Christianity, and shall be in worse case than 
any people on earth.1 
So wrote Luther to Erasmus, and these ·words seem a fitting 
introduction to our examination of the concept of free will in the 
Confessions of' our church. Furthermore, Luther's statement underlines 
the crucial importance of this area of' thought for theology. In 
order to appraise the Confessional position fairly, we turn first to the 
point of view under the theme: "Man, the Creature." 
As we look at our Confessional anthropology we note that man is 
understood on the basis of Scripture. The perspective is Divine rather 
than human. Thus Dr. Pelikan writes: 
The fundamental category in the Biblical doctrine of' man is 
the category "creature." Whatever else Christian theology 
'I!'zy have to sa:y about the nature and destiny of man, it says 
in the limits described by that category. Its picture of' 
man as a sinner, therefore, must portray him as a fallen 
creature. It must not make him a creature of Satan because 
lv.iartin Luther, The Bondage of' the Will, translated by J. I~ Packer 
and O. R. Johnston (Westward, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell. Co., 1957), p. 78. 
7 
of his sin. Nor dare theology forget that it is pre-
cisely ma.n's creaturely derivation from God that makes 
his sin so calamitous. 
Seeking as they do to declare the orthodox Christian 
• I faith on the basis of the Sacred Scriptures, the Lutheran 
Confessions articulate their d~ctrine of man within this 
fundamental Biblical category. 
The understanding of man as a creature is not an attempt to debase 
man but an effort to ground human dignity in God, the creator. Man's 
true dignity is not to be found in any achievement or goodness on man's 
part, but in the basic truth that God created him and still. preserves 
him even af'ter the fall. To confess "I believe that God has created 
me" means that I em God's creature even in the state of my sin. 
Schlink writes: 
At the same time it becomes clear that we believe in God 
not only as the creator of man in general, but of the 
concrete individual person. No function of man is expected. 
Indeed, the long list of things in which man is the creature 
of God--the list which Luther compiled and to which we could 
add--is expressly lef't unfinished when it is stated "that 
none of us has his life of himself, or anything that has 
here been mentioned or can be mentioned, nor can he by 
himself preserve any' of them, however small and unimportant" 
(L·.C. 11,16). Did God, then create sinful man? No. But 
man even in sin and in spite of sin is altogether God's 
creature.3 
Regardless of our spiritual capabilities or religious attainments 
or the lack of them, our relationship to God is one of creature to 
2Jaroslav Pelikan, "The Doctrine of Creation in Lutheran Confessional. 
Theology," Concordia Theological Monthly, XXVI, No. 8, (August 1955), 
569-579. . 
~dmund Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, translated 
by Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Bouman (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg 
Press, 1961), pp. 39a4o. Hereaf'ter Schlink's work will be referred to 
as Schlink, Theology. ,. 
8 
Creator. This fact is never lost sight of in the Confession's view 
of man. Of'ten this is more implicit than explicit,· for aside from 
Luther's explanations to the first article of the Apostles' Creed in 
both Catechisms no separate article is devoted to it. 
The Flacian controversies did serve to point up the necessity of 
ma.king a distinction between man's creatureliness and his corruption. 
Hence the Formula of Concord reaffirms in no uncertain terms man's 
creature-creator relationship to God. 
even af'ter the Fall God is man's creator who creates body 
and soul for him. Therefore the corrupted man cannot be 
identified unqualifiedly with sin itself, for in that 
case God would be the creator of sin ••••• It is of 
course true that this creature and handiwork of God has 
been miserably corrupted by sin, for the dough out of 
which God forms and makes man has been corrupted and perverted 
in Adam and is transmitted to us in this condition. At this 
point all Christian hearts may well ponder God's inexpressible 
· kindness in that he does not immediately cast this corrupted, 
perverted and sinful dough into hell-fire, but out of it he 
makes and fashions our present human nature, which is so 
miserably corrupted by sin, in order that through his beloved 
Son he might clegnse it from sin, sanctity it, and save it 
(F.C. I, 38,39). · 
The love of God is abundantly evident in the Creator-creature 
relationship. This love which has created and sustai~s human life is . 
undeserved and unmerited. In explaining the first Article of.the 
Apostles' Creed Luther str~ssed God's goodness and mercy in providing 
for our human needs. Schlink observes: "In this connection it is 
4.rh.e Book of Concord: The Confessions of" the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert in collaboration 
with Jaroslav Pelikan, Robert H. Fischer, and Arthur C. Piepkorn 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1959), PP• 514, 515. Hereaf'ter ~ 
Book of Concord will be referred to as la£• 
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striking that with all this emphasis on the unmerited character of 
this love the term 'grace' is not used." He al.so notes that the 
Lutheran Confessions nowhere speak o:f a "grace o:f creation" that 
-would correspond to the "grace o:f :forgiveness. 11 5 
At the outset we must recognize the Confession's emphasis on 
"Man, the Creature," the recipient o:f God's goodness in both creation 
and preservatio~. We must recognize al.so the distinction between 
man's creatureliness which is God's workmanship and man's corruption 
which is Satan's workmanship. In :fact, the Creator-creature relation-
ship shapes the line o:f responsibility between man and God. Luther 
pointea out our response in this relationship very simply in the 
-words: "For all .of this I am bound to thank, praise, serve and obey 
him. 116 
In the Large Catechism Luther asserts that we haven't responded 
to God's goodness and mercy as we ought. 
Therefore, this article -would humble and terrify us all. if 
we believed it. For we sin daily with eyes and ears, hands, 
body and soul, money and property, and with all that we have. 
This is especially true o:f those who even fight against the 
Word o:f God. Yet Christians have this advantage, that they 
acknowledge themselves in duty bound 1o serve and obey him :for all these things (L.C. II, 2,22). 
To the cause :for our :failure to respond we now turn. 
5schlink, Theology, p. 40. 
~' p. 345. 
7Ibid., p. 413. 
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Man, the Fallen Creature 
It is no accident that in the Formula of Concord the article on 
Free Will follows the article on Original Sin. The will of man has 
been conditioned by the Fall. Man is not only a creature, he is now 
a fallen creature. His will is now diseased, . unable to establish a 
healthy relationship with God. 
Our churches also teach that since the fall of Adam all 
men who are propagated according to nature are born in sin. 
That is to say, they are without fear of God, are without 
trust in God and are concupiscent. And this disease or vice 
of origin is truly sin, which even now damns 'and brings 
eternal death on those who are not born aga~n through 
Baptism and the Holy Spirit (A.C. I.I, 1,2). . 
Both the Fall and the "Imago Dei 11 are considered in the Confessions 
.under the subject of 110riginal Sin." And although we might wish these 
subjects had received separate treatment, they are given their proper 
relationship to man, who in the Confessions is always viewed as a 
whole. Man is one, and yet conflict rages within man. Man is a creature 
of God and yet man is a sinner estranged from God. 
Man in .this time is therefore, on the one hand, a creature 
and, on the other, a sinner; a creature in his whole nature 
of body and soul, and 11thoroughly and entirely poisoned and 
corrupted" in the sight of God as by "a spiritual leprosy" 
(s.D: I, 6). Every day his reason is given to him by his 
Creator, and yet it is corrupt through_ and through; given to 
him by God, and yet unable to decide in favor of the good. 
Daily God gives man life, and yet as a . sinner he is d~~d~ .. 
Thus man. as a creature receives di~e· love, while as ~ -
sinne:r;-. he is under the. wrath of God •. 
8Ibid., · p. 29. 
9schlink, Theology, p. 44, 45. 
ll 
Here we catch a glimpse of the dialectical tension involved in 
being a ":fallen creature" of God. The fall involves us as human 
beings in the loss of the Ima.go Dei and yet we remain God's creatures. 
The Confessions make no attempt to psychologize or ~xplain the fall.. 
It is simply termed "Adam's disobedience." The result is a loss of 
God's image and involvement in "Original Sin. 11 
To "Fall" one has to fall from something to something. That from 
which man has "fallen" is termed in our Confessions, "the image of 
God." Man has lost the image of God. This image is now defaced. The 
Confessions equate this image with the original concreated righteous-
ness of paradise which included truth, holiness, and righteousness. The 
loss of the "image of God" is also termed "original sin." 
Furthermore, that original sin is the complete lack or 
absence of the original concreated righteousness, or of 
the image of God according to which man was originally 
created in truth, holiness, and righteousness, together 
with a disability and ineptitude as far as the things 
of God are concerned (F.C. I, 10).10 · 
In view of the Confessions original righteousness or the image 
of God involved "a balanced physical constitution" together with a 
"balanced spiritual constitution" that included "knowledge of God, 
:fear of God, trust in God, or at least the inclination and power to 
do these things."11 The Confessions cite Genesis 1:27 as the biblical 
base for this position and interpret the "image of God" to mean the 
1°1£, p. 510. 
llschlink, Theology, p. 47. 
12 
gifts of the knowledge of God, fear of God and trust in God. It is 
only in regeneration by the Holy Spirit that fallen man is "changed into 
His likeness" which is interpreted as a restoration of the true knowledge 
of God. The Confessions accept the traditional position regarding man's 
state of integrity prior to the fall. Schlink observes: 
The concept 'original. sin' clearly presupposes and includes 
the fact of the fall and of man's original state, but this 
presupposition is not further explained, and statements 
about the pristine state and the manner of the fall are 
scanty.12 
This preliminary exploration of the Confessional concepts of 
the Fall and the Ima.go Dei will suffice to introduce us to a con-
sideration of the concept of original sin. 
Original Sin 
The Confessional doctrine of original sin could claim connection' 
with historic Christian doctrine as expressed by Tertullian and 
Augustine.13 In the Apology Melanchthon reviews Augustine's defini-
tion of "concupiscence" before sunnning up ·with this statement: 
In our definition of original sin, therefore, we h~ve 
correctly expressed both elements: lack of ability to 
trust, fear or love God; and concupiscence, which pursues 
carnal ends contrary to the word of God (that is, not only 
the desires of the body but also carnal 'Wisdom and righteous-
ness in which it trusts while it despises God) (Ap. ll, 
26) .14 
12Ibid., p. 41. 
1
~illard Dow Allbeck, Studies in the Lutheran Confessions 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1952), p. 62. Hereafter Al.lbeck's 
work will be referred to as Allbeck, Studies. 
1
~, p. 103. 
13 
Schlink has collated the Confessional references to the doctrine of 
original sin in masterly fashion, and for the sake of convenience and 
brevity we will follow his collation. 
Man as a sinner is 'without fear of God, ••• without trust 
in God, and ••• concupiscent' (A.C. II, 1). This lack of 
the fear of God and of trust in God is by no means merely a 
deficiency, but it is the reality of the creature's active 
rebellion against the Creator, "hating his judgment and 
fleeing it, being angry at him, despairing of his grace, 
trusting in temporal things, etc."--'fleeing God as a tyrant, 
hating and grumbling against his will; again, not daring to 
entrust ourselves to God's goodness, but rather always 
putting more reliance on money, property, and friends' 
{Ap. II, 8).15 
In the Augsburg Confession the Gennan version reads "evil desire 
and inclination" for "concupiscence" which means "the perversity which 
16 loves the evil rather than the good." Schlink, quoting the Confessions, 
expands on this explanation of concupiscence in the following fashion: 
The reality of the enmity against God is again, .not mere~ 
a sinful deed, but it is sinful craving, lust and desire. 
"When we use the term 'concupiscence," we do not mean only 
its acts or fruits but the continual inclination or 
nature" {Ap. II, 3). Concupiscence is a corruption of the 
physical constitution and also 'an evil lust and inclination, 
according to which we, in spite of the best and highest 
faculities {sic) and the light of reason, nevertheless are 
carna~ inclined and minded against God' (Ap. II, 25).17 
Concupiscence is a loaded term, packing the freight of man's 
enmity and hostility toward God. In a sense, it is the loaded gun 
from which actual sin is fired. 
15schli~, Theologi, p. 40. 
16 Allb~ck, Studies, p. 63. 
17
schlink, Theology, p. 40. 
14 
Men are sinners, such as 11are full of evil lusts and 
inclinations from their mothers' ·wombs and are unable 
by nature to have true fear of God and true faith in 
God11 (A.C. II, 1). Sin is not merely the reality of 
individual deeds, but of all thoughts, words and 
deeds of man, both of the evil as well as of the so-
called good ones. 
Thus 'man sins truly even when he performs noble, 
beautiful, and precious deeds, such as the world 
values highly' (Ap. 14, 33). Sin is not merely the 
deed of individual people, but it is a reality for 8 all men. "Here no one is godly11 (s.A. III, iii, 3).1 
From this and countless references of similar nature we can 
conclude that sin is the condition in which we exist from the moment 
of our birth. By nature man is unable to truly fear and trust God. 
Sin is the inescapable prison of every man born of woman. Sin is 
real because original sin is real. and only the virgin-born Son of 
God is excluded from the verdict that al.l men are conceived and born 
in sin.19 
Sin not only affects us individually, but it pervades our 
corporate lives. 11The community of all men, of all their deeds, 
and of all their inclination is, ever since Adam's fal.l, the community 
. ..20 in sin. 
The Confessions heap up analogous phrases seeking to express the 
nature of original sin. 
18Ibid., 
19Ibid. 
20Ib.d 
--1;_·' 
p. 41. 
p. 43. 
15 
Accordingly, original sin is a "deep • • • corruption of . 
nature" (S.A. III,i,3), 'the rapidly spreading hereditary 
plague' (Ap. II 8) the "abominable and dreadful inherited 
disease which h~s ~orruoted our entire nature" (S.D. 8,21), 
by no means only a partial corruption, but a "deep, wicked,. 
abominable, bottomless, inscrutable, and inexpressible 
corruption of his entire nature in all its powers, 
especially of the highest and foremost2fowers of the soul 
in mind, heart, and will" (S.D. I,ll). 
In view of this, it is impossible to view sin only as an act. 
Original sin is not something we do, but a blight on our very 
existence: 
it inheres in the nature, substance, and essence of man 
in such a way that even if no evil thought would ever arise 
in the heart of corrupted man, no idle word were spoken, 
or no wicked act or deed took place, nevertheless man's 
nature is corrupted through original sin (Ep. 1,21), and 
"his nature and person" are as with "a spiritual leprosy 
••• thoroughly and entirely poisoned and corrupted" 
(S.D. I,6). Nothing in man is excepted from this corrup-
tion, neither in his body nor in his soul, neither in his 
deeds nor in his thoughts or inclinations. "The fruits 
of this sin are all the subsequent evil deeds which are 
forbidden in the Ten Commandments" (S.A. ~II,i,2).22 
The natural man will object to this understanding of man by 
pointing out that he has no choice but to sin if this view of man 
is true. And if he has no choice, how then can God hold him responsible1 
Werner Elert discusses this very point in the first chapter of~ 
Structure of Lutheranism under the term Urerlebnis. 
21Ibid. 
-
22Ibid., pp. 43, 44. 
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In this situation it is natural to look first at man. 
One tries to explain this dread (of God) to oneself 
psychologically. But under the eyes of God man comes 
to an altogether different conclusion. For he is 
totally in the grip of a power outside and therefore 
opposed to him. And indeed in a twofold sense. For 
one thing, God demands of him an accounting. God 
holds him· responsible. The fact that God holds him 
responsible shows him conclusively that he actually had 
an obligation to be something, to do s omething, or to 
leave something undone. But now the terrible discovery .• 
God holds him responsible for something he can never 
accomolish. The reason is that for the t'ul.fillment of 
the g~eat "Thou shalt" which hangs over his whole life 
he lacks the first and important thing--free will. His 
will is in bondage. Only when man can no longer be in 
doubt as to the mysterious power that binds him uncon-
ditionally and therefore keeps him from doing what he 
should does this knowledge become terrible in full 
measure. It 1s God Himself. This is the second sense in 
which God has power over him. God makes demands of man. 
and, in spite of this, brings about the very opposite in 
him. As if in mockery, however, He holds him responsible 
for nont'ul.fillment. Man should do what is good, but he 
must do what is evil. We know why Luther is filled with 
dread. Now we know the connection between death and God. 
Furthermore, -,,,e know that this death is something differ-
ent from the .outer end. It is the end of the "moral 
person. 1123 
To this point we now turn in the Confessions, namely that although 
fallen man cannot but sin, he is still responsible before God and his 
sin incurs guilt. 
Even though fallen man cannot but sin, this sin is guilt, 
nevertheless; "is truly sin"--sin which condemns "to the· 
eternal wrath of God" (A.C. II,2). Even though sin is 
inherited sin, 'what a grevious mortal guilt original sin 
is in the sight .of God!' (Ap. II,45). Original sin is 
original guilt, "culpa originls11 (A.C. XXIV,25). Not for 
one moment is concupiscence ever an "adiaphoron," 'neither 
good nor bad' (Ap. II,4lf.), but it is noena et peccatum, 
23werner Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, translated by 
Walter A. Hansen, I (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962), 21. 
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at once penalty and guilt (Ap. II,47), it is the 
punishment inflicted on Adam's children for Adam's deed, 
and yet it never ceases to be the sin and guilt of Adam's 
chi ldren. Guilt ·and not being able to do otherwise, 
guilt and ignorance, responsibility and nature are not 
mutually exclusive in the doctrine of sin. In numerous 
statements any rationalizing of these dreadful para~oxes 
is expressly declined (cf., e.g., Ap. II,1,38,42).2 
In the Confessions the full seriousness of sin and our accountability 
for sin stares us starkly in the face. Sin and Adam's fall are no 
trifling matter. In fact, it exceeds all human reasoning what a 
horrible wrath of God has been handed on to us by this disobedience. 
The results of original sin are many and manifold in their 
implications. Of special interest to this study is man's ignorance 
of God and the tyranny of Satan to which man, the fallen creature, · 
is now subjected. Schlink in his summary focuses his emphasis on 
the "Wrath of God" as he considers the results of original sin. He 
gives man's natural ignorance of God separate treatment. 
Thus we al1 stand under the ·angry God who 'wants to punish 
sin in so dreadful a manner with both temporal and eternal 
penalties' (Ap. IV,129). There (Gen. 3) human nature is 
subjected not only to death and other physical ills, but 
also to the rule of the devil (Ap. II,46), who keeps all 
men under his tyrannical rule, smites them with blindness, 
and seduces to vice. Through Adam's disobedience, i.e., 
through God's wrath because of Adam's disobedience, all 
men are "subject to death and the devil" (S.A. III,·i,J.). 
Thus al1 of us are "'by nature the children of wrath,' of 
death, and of damnation" (S.D. 1,6) . Over against the wrath 
of God man with all his works is "like a ~5ttle feather tossed aside by a hurricane' (Ap. IV,47). · 
24schlink, Theology, p. 44. 
25Ibid. 
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It is essential for us now to consider a man's ignorance of God 
as a result of original sin. Knowledge and will fit together, and 
the Confessions recos i ze this by pointing out the impossibility of 
natural man accomplishing God's will when he does not know God. And 
the Confessions deny that natural man has the ability to know God. 
God is hidden both from man's creatureliness and his corruption. In 
this fallen world neither God's love nor wrath can be recognized by 
fallen man. In fact, the ignoratio Dei is termed the essence of original 
sin. 
Among the "more serious faults of human nature" are men-
tioned "ignoring God, despising Him • • • " ( 'this is our 
true and supreme misery that we are all born in such a way 
that we do not know, see, or notice God and the works of 
God, but despise God •••• ' (Ap. II,8). Original sin 
"involves such faults as ignorance of God, contempt of God, 
lack of the fear of God and of trust in him, inability to 
love him" (Ap. II,14). To define sin correctly we must 
include the loss of 'the knowledge of God' (Ap. II,23). 
Before we heard God's Word 'we were entirely of the devil, 
knowing nothing either of God's love or of God's wrath; 
for, as long as the human heart is at rest~ it 'does not 
feel God's wrath or judgment' (Ap. IV,9).2 
Thus man by his own powers is incapable of obtaining any knowledge 
of God, either from nature or from God's self-revelation in His Word. 
"Original sin spells ignor~ce of God in the most comprehensive sense. 1127 · 
Is there then a contradiction when the Confessions speak of "Man's 
reason or natural intellect" as they frequently do? 
26Ibid., p. 48, 49. 
27Ibid.., p. 49. 
For example, man 
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"d kn d II ( ) 28 has a im spark of the owle ge that there is a God S.D. II,9. 
This question receives no direct answer in the Confessions. 
Apparently it was not r~garded as sufficiently significant to require 
harmonization with the doctrine of the total ignorance of God. 
Schlink demonstrates how the Confessions understand the "dim spark" 
to function in relation to God's law. 
T'ne decalo5-ue requires not only external works which reason can 
accomplish but first and foremost fear and love toward God • . However, 
true fear and love of God are "far beyond the reach of reason." 
Natural man fails to recognize that the real demands of the Ten 
Conunandments can not be fulfilled. Rather he attempts his self-
justification by external observance of the law. "For all human 
reason and wisdom cannot but hold that we must become righteous by 
the law and that a person externally observing the law is holy and 
righteous (A p. IV, 159). 1129 
Since the natural knowledge of the law does not even achieve a 
realization of God's wrath much less His love, it serves to intensify 
man's estrangement from God. In fact, when man takes this "dim spark" 
or general knowledge of God seriously and attempts to put it into 
·practice 
by calling God by name and devising a ritual for him, 
he only falls more deeply into sin with his natural 
obedience to the law and does not come to God but to idols. 
It is true on the one hand that "there has never been a 
28rbid., p. 51. 
29Ibid., p. 50. 
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people so wicked that it did not establish and maintain 
some sort of worship,'! but it is true without exception, 
on the other hand, that "everyone has set up a god of 
his own, to which he 38oked for blessings, help and 
comfort" (L.C. I,17). . 
Hence the natural man knows there is a God but does not know 
who that God is or ·what He is like. Man grasps something of what 
is demanded of him (in the Law), but does not understand who demands 
it, and so fails to recognize God's wrath. Thus natural man knows 
neither God nor his own predicament; he fails to acknowledge the 
innate uncleanness of human nature. God's Word alone is able to 
reveal to us who God is and who we truly are. 
And "this cannot be adjudged except from the Word of 
God" (Ap. II,13; cf. 34). "This hereditary sin is so 
deep a corruption of nature that reason cannot under-
stand it. It must be believed because of the revela-
tion in the Scriptures" (S.A. III,i,3; cf. also Ep. . . 
l,9; S.D. I,8). Original sin is "ultimately the worst 
damage ••• , that we shall not only endure God's 
eternal ·wrath and death but that we do not even realize 
what we are suffering" (S.D. I,62).31 
Even our creatureliness remains hidden from our natural knowledge. 
Man's utter helplessness apart from God's . saving self-rev~lation is 
brought home with raw power. Here is a case where "ignorance is not 
bliss" but the very opposite. 
The Flacian controveries made it necessary for the Formula of 
Concord to make a clear distinction between man's creatureliness and 
30ibid., p. 51. 
31Ibid., p. 52. 
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his corruption. We cannot discuss this controversy in detail here but 
the Formula's conclusions should be noted. 
The Solid Decla.:r.-c;~::Lon roakes three affirmative points: 
that mankind's i nher ited spiritual malady is truly sin; 
that nature comes from God but sin from the devil; that 
the corruption of human nature is complete and total. 
These points are followed by a sunnnary of the declarations 
of the Apology with reference to the results, extent, 
terribleness, penalty and cure of original sin.32 
The Epitome also points out the necessity of a distinction between 
human nature and sin, the reasons for this distinction, and reaffirms 
the total corruption of human nature which results from original sin. 
We believe, teach, and confess that there is a distinction 
between man's nature and original sin, but only in the 
beginning when God created man pure and holy and without 
sin, but also as we now have our nature af'ter the Fall. 
Even after the fall our nature is and remains a creature of 
God. The distinction between our nature and original sin 
is as great as the difference between God's work and the 
devil's ·work. 33 
There are several other implications in the Confessional doctrine 
of original sin; for instance, .the relatio~ship of original sin to 
sexuality: "Ever since man sinned, natural desire and the lust that 
in:f1.ames it conetogether; therefore marriage is more necessary now than 
in a state of purity."34 Kierkegaard also mentions this subject, but 
unfortunately we cannot delve further into it. It might make a good 
subject of study by itself and shed some meaning:f'ul. light on a subject 
that is repeatedly discussed but often misunderstood in our sex-obsessed 
32Allbeck, Studies, p. 257. 
33:Bc, p. 466. . 
34rbid., p. 241.. 
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culture. 
Of necessity there will. be much overlapping between the subject 
we have just covered, namely original sin, and the subject to which 
we now turn, namely free will. FoF all practical purposes the · 
Confessions treat both as two sides of the same coin. 
Free Will 
The background against which the concept of free will. unfolds 
in the Confessions is the Pelagian heresy which though condemned 
still. lingered in the medieval church. Basically the stance taken 
by Pelagianism failed to take seriously original sin and is the 
antithesi~ of all that has been previously said concerning natural 
~.an's condition and predicament before God. When free will. is considered 
in the Confessions it is considered only i~ relationship to natural man 
after the Fall.. As Allbeck notes, "There may be a study of human 
nature as created, or as born, or as reborn."35 The Confessions focus 
on man as he is "born. " · 
At. the outset it should be noted that the' approach of the Confes-
sions is Scripturall.y based. Its inquiry is about fre~ will. in 
unregenerate man, born according to nature, dominated by original sin. 
No attempt to solve the philosophical:- problem of free will is made. 
Religious implications of the doctrine are the ~hief concern of the 
Confessions and its definition of free will. is a theological one. 
35Al.lbeck, Studies, p. 107. 
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There is little concern expressed about reconciling the tension of 
man's creatureliness and his corruption. Philosophical detenninism 
which has so preoccupied western thought was not a concern of the 
Confessions. The philosophical. approach to human freedom impinges 
upon the existentialist movement in Berdyaev whose concept of per-
sonal freedom differs radically from orthodox Christian doctrine.36 
In the Formula the further explication of free will is grounded 
not only in Scripture but also in the previous confessional state-
ments made in the Augsburg Confession and the Apology. Allbeck notes 
that the framers of the Formula used Melanchthon's methods to pro-
pogate not his, but Luther's views. The theological position of the 
Formula is thoroughly Lutheran·. 37 
The Synergistic controversy is the occasion for the further 
consideration of this subject in the Formula. Luther insisted on 
the monergism of God's grace. His view was that "man does nothing 
in conversion, but the divine agency operates in him through the 
means of grace ... 38 Nevertheless, Luther did recognize that man 
could resist this offered grace. But 
36ia_umpp, David J. 
(Unpublished Bachelor's 
pp. 11, 19. 
"Concept of Personal Freedom in Berdyaev" 
Thesis, Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1959), 
37Allbeck, Studies, p. 252. 
38Ib.d 
--2:....·, p. 259. 
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In the course of the years Melanchthon wrote on these 
topics in such a wa:y as to make less sharply clear the-
monergism of God's grace. He used broader and somewhat 
more ambiguous terms. Instead of viewing conversion 
only from GQd's side, he tried to see it from -man's 
side also. 3~ 
Some of Melanchthon's students became synergists and this made 
necessary the clarification the Formula pr esents. Basically it seeks 
to answer this q_uestion: What spiritual abi lity does unregenerate 
human nature have? 
Perhaps the best background or introduction is offered by the 
Confessions themselves in the following paragraph. 
But it is of these that the Scripture everywhere warns us 
of these that the prophets constantly complain, namely, 
carnal security, contempt of God, hate of God, and similar 
faults that we are born with. The scholastics mingled 
Christian doctrine with philosophical views about the per-
fection of nature and attributed more than was proper to 
free will and to 11elicited acts.'' They taught that men are 
justified before God by philosophical or civic righteousness, 
which we agree is subject to reason and somewhat in our power. 
But thereby they failed to see the inner uncleanness of 
human nature. T'nis cannot be adjudged except from the Word 
of God, which the scholastics ~8 not of'ten employ in their 
discussions {Ap. II,11,12,13) • . 
With this brief background we mey now begin our consideration of 
the ·concept of free will. The Augsburg Confession succinctly picture·s 
our Confes~ional position in Article eighteen. 
It is also taught among us that man possesses some measure 
of freedom of the will which enables him to live an out-
wardly honorable life and to make choices among the things 
that reason comprehends. But without the grace, help, and 
activity of the Holy Spirit man is not capable of making 
39Ibid. 
-
4
~,. p. 102. · 
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himself acceptable to God, of fearing God and believing 
in God with his whole heart, or of e~pelling inborn evil 
lusts from his heart. This is accomplished by the Holy 
Spirit, who is given through the Word of God, for Paul 
says in 1 Cor. 2:14, "Natural man does not receil{:r_ the 
gii'ts of the Spirit of God," (A.C. XVIII,1,2,3). 
The first thing to strike us in this article is the clear dis-
tinction made between the "outwardly honorable life" and true 
righteousness before God. The Apology adds to our understanding of 
this distinction. 
Therefore we may profitably 9-istinguish between civil 
righteousness and spiritual righteousness, attributing 
the fonner to the free will and the latter to the oper-
ation of the Holy Spirit in the reg~nerate. ·This safe-
guards outward discipline, because all men ought to know 
that God requires this civil righteousness and that, to 
some extent, we can achieve it. At the same time it shows 
the difference between human righteousness and spiritual 
righteousness, between philosophical teaching and the 
teaching of the Holy Spirit; and i42points out the need for the Holy Spirit (Ap. XVIII,9). · 
From this -...re observe that our terminology is defined, "civil 
righteousness" being in part at least a product of free will, and 
"spiritual righteousness" which is the result of the Holy Spirit's 
operation in man. The interesting thing to note is the ambiguity here 
in defining t _he limits of man's ability to attain civil righteousness, 
for the words "to some extent we can achieve it" leave the question 
of 'to what extent' unresolved. By the very nature of this question, 
however, we become involved in the complexities of human ·relativity. 
41Ibid., p. 39. 
42Ibid., p. 226. 
The Confessions are aware of this as they point out: 
We are .not denying freedom to the human will. The human 
will has freedom to cho0se among the works and things 
which reason by itself c :.:1 grasp. To some extent it can 
achieve civil righteousness or the righteousness of works. 
It can talk about God and express its worship of him in 
outward works. It can obey rulers and parents. Externally, 
it can choose to keep the hands from murder, adultery, or 
the~. Since human nature still has reason and judgment 
about the thi ngs that the senses can grasp, it also 
r etains a choice in these things , as well as the liberty 
and ability to achieve civil righteousness. This 
righteousness which the carnal nature--that is, the 
reason--can achieve on its o,-m without the Holy Spirit, 
Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh. But so 
great is the power of concupiscence that men obey their 
evil impulses more often than their sound judgment, while 
the devil, who as Paul says (Eph. 2:2) is at work in the 
ungodly, never stops inciting this feeble nature to various 
of fenses. For these reasons even civik righteousness is 
rare among men •• • • (Ap. XVIII,4,5). 3 
The pivotal place of reason in the functioning of civil righteous-
ness is apparent in the foregoing statement. Since man's ability to 
reason varies from one to another a relativity will be observable in 
natural man's achievement of civil righteousness. However, one .dare 
not predicate man's attainment of civil righteousness solely on the 
basis of reason, because a foreign element is introduced here, namely, 
the devil and temptation. 
The limitation put upon reason is also extremely significant, 
for it is limited to only "those things which the senses can grasp." 
Hence, that which transcends sense perception is out of bonds to 
reason. 
43Ibid., p. 225. 
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The limitation put upon reason is also extremely significant, 
for it is limited to only "those things which the senses can grasp. 
Hence, that which transcends sense perception is out o~ bonds to 
reason. 
A connection between reason, judgment and choice is also men-
tioned. Natural man retains a choice in the "things that the 
senses can gra::-:p, 11 and has the liberty and ability to achieve civil 
righteousness to this extent. 
The lament that few attain even to the "righteousness of works" 
is valid for the Confessions maintain that God requires such 
righteousness of man. 
We for our part maintain that God requires the righteous-
ness of' reason. Because of God's command, honorable works 
commanded in the Decalogue should be perfonned, according 
to Gal. 3:24, "The law is a custodian," and 1 Tim. 1:9, 
"the law is laid down for the lawless." For God wants 
this civil discipline to restrain the unspiritual, and 
to preserve it he has given laws, learning, teaching, 
governments, and penalties. To some extent, reason can 
produce this righteousness by its own strength, though 
it is often overwhelmed by its natural weakness and by 
the devil, who drives it to open crimes. We freely give 
this righteousness of reason its due credit; for our 
corrupt nature has no greater good than this •••• God 
even honors it with material rewards. Nevertheless, it 
ought4~ot be praised at the expense of Christ (Ap. rl, 22f). ~ 
Here the constructive function of civil righteousness is 
acknowledged, but the last sentence alludes to the possibility ·or 
this righteousness of reason getting in the way of true spiritual 
44Ib.d 
__L·, p. 110. 
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righteousness. This is our next point. 
Although we concede to free will the liberty and ability 
to do the outward works of the law, we do not ascribe to 
it the spiritual capacity for true fear of God, true faith 
in God, true knowledge and trus45that God considers, hears and forgives us (Ap. XVIII, 7). 
Thus we can conclude that in view of the Confessions "true fear 
of God, true faith in God, true knowledge of God" are not products 
of human reason. First, because God stands beyond the grasp of 
the senses. Second, because human reason has fallen into an alien 
captivity, namely that of the devil. This stand is forcibly 
driven home in the Fonnula. 
Although man's reason or natural intellect still has a 
dim spark of the knowledge that there is a God, as well 
as of the teaching of the law (Rom. 1:19-21,28,32) never-
theless, it is so ignorant, blind and perverse that when 
even the most gifted and the most educated people on earth 
read or hear the Gospel of the Son of God and the promise 
of eternal salvation, they cannot by their own powers 
perceive this, comprehend it, understand it, or believe 
and accept it as the truth. On the contrary, the more 
zealously and diligently they want to comprehend these 
spiritual things with their reason; the less they under-
stand or believe, and until the Holy Spirit enlightens 
and teaches them they coll5ider it all mere foolishness . and fables (F.C. II, 9). 
The preceding paragraph echoes Luther's eloquent explanation 
to the third article of the Apostles' Creed. Here too, the limits 
of human reason and strength are sharply drawn. 
In this statement from the Formula the assertion is ma.de that 
reason can actually hinder man's understanding and faith in the 
45Ib"d 
_L·, 
46Ib"d __ 1._., 
p. 225, 226. 
p. 521, 522. 
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Gospel of the Son of God. The foundation for this assertion is 
the catalog of Scripture passages marshalled to show the inability 
of human reason to comprehend Divine grace. The key passage in 
this list is (1 Cor. 2:14) "The unspiritual man does not receive 
the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly for him, and 
he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually 
discerned." The conclusion the Formula draws is: 
Thus Scripture denies to the intellect, heart, and will 
of the natural man every capacity, aptitude, skill and 
ability to think anything good or right in spiritual 
matters, to understand them, to begin them, to will them, 
to undertake them, to do them, to accomplish or 
cooperate in them as of himself. ''Not that we are suffi-
cient of ourselves to claim anyth:i.ng as c~,ing from us; 
our sufficiency is from God~' (2 Cor.3:5). 
Hence the verdict of the Formula concurs and supports the 
position affirmed in the Augsburg Confession and Apology. In 
the realm of the spirit, man's "free _will" is impotent, and if 
anything his reason is a hindrance. 
Accordingly, we believe that after the Fall and prior to . 
his conversion not a spark of spiritual powers has re-
mained or exists in man by which he could make himself 
ready for the grace of God or to accept the preferred 
grace, nor that ·he has any capaci~y for grace by and for 
himself or can apply himself to it or prepare l':limself 
for it, or help, do, effect, or cooperate his conversion 
by his own powers, either altogether or half-way or in 
the tiniest or smallest degree, 11of himself as coming 
from himself," but is a slave of .sin (John 8:34), the 
captive of the devil who drives him (Eph. 2:2; 2 Tim. 
47Ibid., p. 522. 
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2:26). Hence according to its perverse disposition 
and nature the natural free wi ll is mighty and active 
only in the direction of that
4
~hich is displeasing and 
contrar y to God (F.C. II, 7). ' 
Allbeck notes t hat the threefold designation "intellect, he~rt,· 
and will" reflects the "ancient psychological distincti'On of the 
intellectual, the volitional, and the affective phases of the 
mind. 1149 The Confessions thus reflect the traditional psychological 
understanding of man. 
All that has been stated here could have been stated under the 
concept of original sin. This underscores again the point already 
made , that in the Confessions original sin is the conditioning 
factor in understanding the free will. 
However, the Fonnula, too, recognizes the constructive con~ 
tribution of civil righteousness produced in part by free will. 
It allows that God rewards civil righteousness with temporal 
blessings. The Formula also notes that since such outwardly noble 
acts do not flow from faith, they are sinful. Faith alone is 
recognized as "the mother and source of the truly good and God-
pleasing ~orks that God wi ll reward both in this and in the next 
world . 11 5o 
48Ibid., p. 521. 
49Allbeck, Studies, p. 261. 
50
~, p. 552. 
31 
Faith is the indispensable prerequisite before we can do any-
thing that pleases God. If we can not please God, then spiritual 
righteousness is impossible for us, and if so we are in bondage to 
an alien evil power. "For before we became members of the 
Christian church we belonged entirely to the devil and were com-
pletely ignorant of God and Christ. 11 51 The urgent question now 
becomes: How can I prepare myself' for faith1 Quoting Luther tpe 
Fonnula notes that our "free will has no power of its own to 
prepare itself and to strive for righteousness." There is no 
cooperation on the part of man's will in conversion. Rather, 
Outside of Christ death and sin are our masters and the 
devil is our god and lord, and there is no power or 
ability, no cleverness or reason, with which we can 
prepare ourselves for righteousness and seek after it. 
On the contrary, we must remain the dupes and captives 
of sin and the property of the devil to .do and to think 
_what pleases them and what is contrary to God and His 
commandments (F.C. II,43).~~ 
Natural man can do nothing to prepare himself' for salvation. 
However, the Confessions do allow that natural man can expose him-
self' to the means through ~hich God works faith. This point is 
made by Bonhoeffer in The Cost of Discipleship and he no doubt 
had this reference in mind. 
The person who is not yet converted to God and regen-
erated can hear and . read this Word externally because, 
as stated above, even after th~ Fall man still has 
51Ibid., p. 528. 
52~., p. 529. 
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something of a free will in these external matters, 
so that he can go to church, 153ten to the sermon, or not listen to it (F.C. II,53). 
Faith and the Means of Grace 
How does one come to faith? God kindles faith through the 
operation of His Holy Spirit who works through the means of grace 
in the hearts, wills, and minds of men. 
Through this means (namely, the preaching and hearing 
of his Word) God is active, breaks our hearts, and 
draws man, so that through the preaching of the law 
man learns to know his sins and the wrath of God and 
experiences genuine terror, contrition, and sorrow in 
his heart, and through the preaching of and medita-
tion upon the holy Gospel or the gracious forgiveness 
of sin in Christ there is kindled in him a spark of 
faith which accepts the forgiveness of sins for 
Christ's sake and comforts itself with the promise of 
the Gospel. And in this way the Holy Spirit who works 
all this, is introduced into the heart (F.C. II,54).54 
So God draws natural man in such a way that his darkened reason 
becomes enlig~tened and his resisting will becomes an obedient 
will. The Holy Spirit initiates the work of renewal and regeneration 
in us through the Word and the holy Sacraments. And although natural 
man is unable to cooperate in his conversion, regenerate man can 
and. must cooperate with the power of the Holy Spirit in his sancti-
fication, even though this be in great ~eakness.55. Hence there is 
53Ibid~, p. 531. 
54Ibid. 
55Ibid., pp. 533, 534. 
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a great difference betwee~ natural man and regenerate man. 
There is therefore a great difference between baptized 
people and unbaptized people because, according to the 
teaching of St. Paul, "all who have been baptized have 
put on Christ" (,.,JJ.. 3:27) , are thus truly born again, 
and now have a liberated will--that is, as Christ says, 
they have again been made free. As a result, they not 
only hear the Word of God but also are able to assent 
to it and accept it6 even though it be in great weak-ness (F.C. II,67).5 
Conversion does not spell the end to the struggle for freedom. 
Rather freedom in a spiritual sense begins only with faith. This 
casts us full force into the fray as the following words show. 
But since in this life we have received only the first 
fruits of the Spirit, and regeneration is not as yet 
perfect but has only begun in us, the conflict and . 
warfare of the flesh against the Spirit continues also 
in the elect and truly reborn. Again, there is not 
only a great difference between Christians, one being 
weak and the other strong in the Spirit, but even the 
individual Christian in his own life discovers that 
at one moment he is joyful in the Spirit and at another 
moment fearful and terrified, at one time ardent in 
love, strong in faith and in hope, and at another time 
cold and weak (F.C. II,68).57 
How aptly this describes the Christian life can only be recog-
nized by a believer engaged in this same struggle. 
This section of our study can be concluded with words from 
Luther's masterful treatise on the subject of man's not so free will. 
If we do not want to drop this term altogether (namely 
free will)--which would really be the safest and most 
Christian thing to do--we may still in good faith 
teach people to use it to credit man with 'free-will' 
56Ibid., p. 534. 
57Ibid. 
in this respect, not of what is above him, but of 
what is below him. That is to say, man should 
rea lize that in regard t o his money and possessions 
he has a right to use them, to do or to leave undone, 
according to his own 'free-will'--though that very 
'free-will' is overruled by the free-will of God 
alone, according to His own pleasure. However, with 
regard to God, and in all that bears on salvation 
or damnation, he has no 'free-will', but is a captive·, 
prisoner and bondslavse either to the will of God, or 
to the will of Satan. 
Conclusions 
The first consideration noted in this chapter was the pervasive 
understanding of man as creature and God as Creator in the Con-
fessions. The Christian study of man must operate within this 
framework and the Confessions certainly do. In fact, so pervasive 
is this understanding that Confessional statements on original 
sin and free will of ten presuppose the creatureliness of man. This 
perhaps explains why there is in the Confessions no separate 
treatment given to the Fall or to the Image of God. 
In our examination of original sin we discovered the important. 
distinction between man's nature as creature, and thus the handi-
work of God, and man's corrupted nature, the work of Satan. The 
totality of man's impotence in spiritual matters could hardly have 
been more emphatically stated. The disastrous effect of original 
sin is not limited to man's body while his soul escapes unscathed.. 
Rather man is treated as a whole, and his whole nature is involved 
58r.uther, The Bondage of the Will, p. 107. 
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in the corruption and poisoning that results from original sin.59 
This understanding of man effectively blocks the classic dualistic 
view of man prevalent in western idealism. 
In our study of free will a distinction between civil righteous-
ness and spiritual righteousness became evident. The intimate 
connection of reason to civil righteousness was apparent in that 
such human goodness was even termed "the righteousness· of reason." 
The limits of reason were likewise noted and the boundaries fixed 
at "the things which the senses can grasp. 1160 This position 
undercuts any rationalistic or philosophical approach to God, just 
as the interpretation of original sin demolishes all moralistic 
approaches to God. 
In this chapter we also discovered that the Confessional 
statements on original sin and free will are in reality two sides 
of the same stone. Natural man sees free will as the top side, 
but when he seriously considers it, stoops, and picks µp ,the stone, 
he discovers on the underside, amid the slugs and ·slime, the 
inescapable reality of original sin. Even this discovery can not 
be made without the Holy Spirit's activity in natural ·man. Once 
· this realization is .accepted, it disallows any presumed powers 
of free will in the spiritual ·realm. There is therefore in the 
Confessional exposition of these two concepts an essential oneness. 
59Supra, p. 10. 
60 Supra, p. 25. 
Another pertinent observation is the form of the Confessional 
presentation of this position. In a sense the framers of our 
Confessions were in the position of one vho had just challenged 
another to a duel and thus had forfeited the choice of weapons. 
Although scholastic methodology and terminology is used in the 
Confessions, these do not obscure the evangelical thrust of the 
Confessions' message • . The rhythm of sin and grace, law and gospel 
is certainly apparent. T'ne pragmatic concern for man's eternal 
salvation is constantly kept in the forefront. Nevertheless, 
some of the strong new wine of the biblical view of man is poured 
i nto the old wine skins of tradj_tional scholastic categories. 
This ,ras no doubt done to show continuity with past tradition, but 
at times it seems to blunt the cutting edge of man's paradoxical 
nature as "saint and sinner" or creature and corrupted creature. 
The exact relationship of reason and will ·was not made explicit 
in the Confessions. But implicit in the Confessional understanding 
of man is the view that reason is antecedent to will . This under-
standing of the relationship between reason and will lends itself to 
the abuse ff rationalism, and history bears this out. 
The Confessions approach both original sin and free will from 
God's point of view. The direction of movement is consistently 
from God to man. Psychology and philosophy, while implicit here 
and there in the Confessional statements, are not explicitly 
defined. It is also significant that the Confessions place the 
concepts of original sin and free will in the proper perspective 
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by treating them within the context of the whole plan of salvation. 
The Confessions accept the traditional view of man's integrity 
prior to the Fall without speculation as to the difference in 
existence before the advent of sin. This is significant becaus~ 
we will note in chapter three that Kierkegaard does not accept 
the traditional understanding of man's innocence. 
One apparent wee.kness in the Confessions' exposition is the attempt 
to make quantitive tenns express a quality of existence. The term 
"dim spark" occurs in an attempt to show that the possibility of 
communication and communion with God exists. The distinction between 
external works and the work of the Holy Spirit which is viewed as 
internal is a vulnerable distinction and liable to misapplication. 
Bonhoeffer points this out in a later chapter. 
The problem of the relationship ·between. "civil righteousness" 
and "spiritual righteousness" is one which the Confessions struggle 
to enunciate clearly. It is obviously difficult to set forth this 
relationship systematically in a comprehensive fashion. Perhaps 
this needs to be acknowledged. On the other hand, perhaps the 
categories of "civil righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" 
are not completely adequate. We will note that Kierkegaard uses 
different categories to make a distinction and yet show relationship 
in chapter three. Ultimately, the question seems to be: "Can 
Melanchthon's Aristotelian philosophy serve as an adequate vehicle 
for dynamic Lutheran theology?" 
Finally, our Confessions do not attempt to expatiate on original 
sin and free will from the human point of view. When Melanchthon 
attempted to view conversion f!om the human perspective difficulty 
arose. Mela.nchthon's attempt and the consequent controversy may 
be a portent of things to come, for we turn now to Kierkegaard's 
concept of human freedom. 
CHAPTER III 
KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL 
The Man, the Me·.:.n0d , and the Motive 
The moment I take Christianity as a doctrine and so indulge 
my cleverness or profundity or my eloquence or my imagina-
tive powers in depicting it: people are very pleased; I am 
looked upon as a serious Christian. 
The moment I begin to express existentially what I say, 
and consequently to bring Christianity into reality: 
it is just as though I had exploded existence--the scandal 
is there at once.l 
This introduction of Kierkegaard, the man, will of necessity be 
brief. There is a plethora of introductory material available to the 
serious student. Instead of presenting an interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's early life it see~s best to let him speak for himself 
from his Journals. In 1835 he penned these lines: 
Then it was that the great earthquake occurred, the 
terrible revolution which suddenly forced upon me a 
new and infallible law of interpretation of all the 
facts. Then I suspected that my father's great age was 
not a divine blessing but rather a curse; that the out-
standing intellectual gifts of our family were only given 
to us in order that we should rend each other to pieces: 
then I felt the stillness of death grow around me when~ 
saw my father, an unhappy ·man who was to outlive us all, 
a cross on the tomb of all his hopes. There must be a 
guilt upon the whole family, the punishment of God must 
be on it; it was to disappear, wiped out by the powerful 
hand of God, obli terated like an unsuccessful attempt, 
and only at :times did I find a little alleviation in the 
1s~ren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierke~ard, translated by 
Alexander Dru (New York: Harper & Brothers, 195 ), p. 174. 
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t hought that my father had been allotted the heavy task 
of calming us with the consolation of religion, of 
ministering to us so that a better world should be open 
t o us even though we lost everything in this world, even 
t hough we were overtaken by the punishment which the 
J ews a lways called down upon t heir enemies: that all 
recollection of us should be utterly wiped out, that 
we should no longer be found.2 
Two years later Kierkegaard would note in his Journal: 
Inwardly torn asunder as I was, without any expectation of 
leading a happy earthly life ( 11that I shou•ld prosper and 
live long in the land"), without hope of a happy and com-
fortable future--as it naturally springs from and lies in 
the historical continuity of family life--what wonder then 
that in desperate despair I grasped at nought but the 
intellectual side in man and clung fast to it, so that the 
thought of my own considerable powers of mind was my only 
consola.t.ion, ideas my one joy, and mankind indifferent to 
me.3 
In the foregoing autobiographical sketches we are given an 
intimate and candid view of the heart and mind of S~ren ~~erkegaard.. 
Perhaps a few external facts about his lif e will prove helpful. 
Copenhagen, Kierkegaard's home town, was a 11provincial ma.r~et 
town" during his life time (1813-1855). At the age of twenty-five 
S~ren began receiving an allowance from his father and later that 
year when Michael P~dersen Kierkegaard. died S~ren received enough 
of an inheritance to sustain his work as an author until his death 
seventeen years later. 
Kierkegaard never married although he was engaged. He broke this 
engagement in October 1841. This left a deep mark on him but this 
2Ibid., p. 39. 
3Ibid., p. 40. 
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experience also marks the beginning of his literary work. At forty-
two Kierkegaard died, nearly penniless, but having been in his words, 
"a witness to the truth." 
We turn now briefly to his "method" which sheds light on under-
standing his work. Kierkegaard's first works (1841-1845) embrace 
several aesthetic and ethical volumes published under pseudonymns. 
For the most part, these works follow the method of indirect communi-
cation, and some of these are of considerable significance in the 
Kierkegaard corpus. 
Dru comments: 
The oustanding feature of this part of his work is the 
polemic against Hegel, a criticism of the whole corpus 
of post-Christian philosophy from Spinoza to Hegel; an 
attack on "philosophy" itself for its wordy metaphysics 
and its verbal scepticism and for its original sin of . 
divorcing thought from existence or reality. It is 
also a criticism, on the moral and psychological level, 
of the humanism of that period •••• That world, with 
its rationalist philosophies and its aesthetic humanism, 
was, in his view, already moribund, a mirage, but a 
potent illusion which prevented min from seeing the real 
problems of both faith and doubt. 
In the writings of this period Kierkegaard begins from various 
points of view, but he always moves in the same direction, either 
toward the "choice" in Either-Or or toward· the "leap of faith" in 
Fear and Trembling. He is guided by his conception of the 
"individual" who encounters the 11moment" in which "decision and 
action fuse thought and existence, the moment in which temporal and 
4
~, pp. 19, 20. 
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eternal meet and man can fulfill his destiny. 115 
In his attempt to counter Hegelianism Kierkegaard emphasizes 
feeling of passion: 
Kierkegaard would, however, be misunderstood if it were 
not at once made clear that feeling is not sentiment or 
emotion isolated from the other faculties of mind. 
Feeling and passion are only the gateway to reality when 
purified by reason and will and integrated by that pro-
cess with the other faculties. Feeling is in one sense 
the faculty which leads to the quality of intensity of 
our knowledge, as opposed to knowledge which is signi-
ficant by virtue of its extensi ty. It is only when both 
are co-ordinated that "the individual" begins to exist 
and becomes a complete man. The error of rationalism is 
therefore twofold. It limits man to being "a rational 
animal," and because it excludes feeling, limits him to 
one form of communication which, by definition excludes 
reality. It is the world of a mau who "has forgotten 
what it means to exist," who does not 5eally live in the same categories as he thinks in •••• 
From the foregoing it becomes clear that "the choice" and "the 
leap of faith" are not arbitrary acts of the will divorced from 
reason and feeling, but rather are actions of the whole man which 
give him the right to speak of existence. Dru observes: 
It might almost be said that Kierkegaard reverses the 
cogito. Instead of saying "I think., therefore I em," 
he says, "Only if I exist sensu eminenti can I begin to 
think" and that thought, moreover, requires a dual form 
of communication, both direct and indirect.7 
Kierkegaard viewed "imagination" as the synthesis of feeling, 
reason, and will. It is the "reflection" which fuses the three 
5rbid., p. 20. 
6Ibid., P• 2J: 
' 
22. 
7Ibid., p. 23. 
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faculties of "the individual." Choice which is the act by which the 
fusion of feeling, reason, and will takes place is never for Kierkegaard 
the choice of something c.,:ternal. It is always the choice of one's 
self, of a complete existence. 
Prior to that constitutive act man is always consciously 
or unconsciously in despair, for despair is the disinte-
gration of personality in the course of which one or the 
other of the faculties assumes 11supremacy": either reason, 
resulting ~n rationalism; or feeling, resulting in senti-
mentality; or will, resulting in voluntarism. It is 
really only after the "choice" that "the leap of faith" 
becomes possible, rgr only the complete man can really . 
become a Christian. 
As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, "man only begins to exist in 
fa ith." Real Christianity is a new level of existence. The task is 
not to prove Christianity before the fact, but to demonstrate it af'ter 
t he fact. Thus the second part of Kierkegaard's work becomes a direct 
communication or witness to the Christian faith. Dru regards the 
"problem of communication11 as the "distinctive characteristic" of 
Kierkegaard's work, work upon ·which he renders this verdict: 11That, 
as far as I can see, i s the core of Kierkegaard's word, neither 
r ationalistic, nor irrationalistic, nor inhuman. 119 
Before leaving this section on method we must look at Heinemann's 
evaluation of two of Kierkegaard's works central to this study. The 
Concept of Dread (?,-844) is from Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, 
while The Sickness Unto Death (1849) is from Kierkegaard's later works. 
8rbid. 
9Ibid., pp. 23, 24. 
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Self-estrangement is to him primarily a process going on 
in one's O\m self, not an external, but an internal rela-
tion, based on one's o~ attitude to oneself. Kierkegaard 
therefore becomes the psychologist or rather the psycho-
pathologist of self-estrangement. He heralds the Age of 
Anxiety by describing the s·tate of alienation as anxiety. 
In the Concept of Dread this sort of alienation finds a 
most profound and penetrating psychological analysis as 
11being dominated in a state of anxiety by an alien power 
which threatens our dissolution." 
He goes, however, one step further in his analysis of 
alienation as an internal happening within oneself in his The 
Sickness unto Death. Anxiety is now transformed into despair, 
and despair is "the sickness unto death. 11 This is one of the 
most important of his publications; it implies a phenomenology 
of despair and of its forms and, at the same time, a sort of 
existentialist psychology of despair. It marks simultaneously 
an important state in the spiritual history of modern man, 
namely the point where modern doubt and scepticism turn inward, 
focus on one's own self and therefore lead to despair. Despair, 
says Kierkegaard, is the misproportion in the relation of the 
self to itself, or every disturbance in the process of be-
coming a Self, a sort cf self-consumption, a specific illness 
of man as a spiritual bei ng, arising from hi s attempt to 
separate himself from the power which created him, or from 
the fact that he neglects what is eternal in him a.~d forgets 
his spiritual nature. Whoever haf 0no God has no Self, and he who has no Self is in despair. 
Having examined briefly the man and his method, we now look at 
what is termed his "motive." This is meant to describe the theolo-
gical-philosophical-cultural milieu in which Kierkegaard found himself 
and in which he tried to act as a corrective. For S~ren Kierkegaard 
did consider himself to be a corrective. 
He who must apply a "corrective must study accurately and 
profoundly the weak side of the Establishment, and then 
vigorously and one-sidedly present the opposite. Precisely 
in this consists the corrective1 and in this too the 
1
'7. H. Heinemann, Existentialism end the Modern Predicament 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks; Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1953), 
pp. 36, 37. 
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resignation of him who has to apply it. The corrective 
will in a sense be sacrificed to the established order. 
I f this is true, · a presumably clever pate can reprove the 
corrective for being one - s~ded. Ye gods! Nothing is 
easier for hi m who applies t he corrective than to supply 
the other side; but then it ceases to be the corrective 
and becomes t he established order.11 
vlhat did Kierkegaard feel constrained to correct? ~.artin gives 
a quick glimpse of three factors that influenced the course and emphasis 
of Kierkegaard's work. 
There is firstly t he danger of the r at i onalistic approach 
to t he understanding of Christianity, or the scientific 
attitude which requi res the truth of Christianity to be 
demonstrated with t he same logical conviction as the 
sc i entist is able to produce for his truths. Kierkegaard 
st ands for the position that the Christian Gospel, by its 
very nature cannot be understood within rational and 
logical categories. Human rea son is a divine gift to 
man •••• But in relation to the Divine world of eternity, 
human reason comes up against a boundary beyond which it 
cannot operate successt'u.lly, because beyond that boundary 
it is attempting to deal with a truth which is incommensurable 
with the scientific truth of the material world.12 
A second factor that inf1.uenced Kierkegaard is closely related 
to the rationalist approach. It is: 
t he danger of the approach to the understanding of 
Christianity through Idealistic Philosophy, and especially 
through the conception of the Divine as immanent in all 
the processes of nature and in the spirit of man. Such phil-
osophy implies an ultimate _continuity between nature, man and 
God; otherwise the aim of the philosophical thinker to present 
a coherent system of Reality would be impossible.13 
lls~ren Kierkegaard, Attack Upon 'Christendom,' translated by 
Walter Lowrie (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1944), p. 90. 
12H. v. Martin, The Wings of Faith (A consideration of the nature 
and meaning of Christian faith in the light of the work of S~ren 
Kierkegaard) .(New~·York: Philosophical Li brary, 1951.), p. 38. 
13Ibi· d. , 38 39 pp. ' • 
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In the face of both rationalism and a religious philosophy of 
i mmanence Kierkegaard insisted on the "infinite qualitative difference" 
between God and man, time and eternity. Sin had severed man's exis-
tence. Any real Gospel .had to cope with and remedy the tragic predica-
ment of man'q dividedness. 
The third danger which Kierkegaard sought to combat was the 
danger of a "far:ile acceptance of nominal Christianity without ever 
experiencing 'the qualitative encounter ·with the Divine.,,; Thus 
Kierkegaard 
set himsel f to awaken inward unrest by proclaiming the 
New Te st ament standard of what it means to be a Christian. 
Mere birth i nt o a Christian community, or membership in a 
Christi an Church is of no avail. Blind assent to Christian 
dogma i s not faith but superstition. Nor is saving faith 
just the natural awakening of the soul to the all-pervading 
pr esence of the i mmanent Divine. To be a Christian in 
the New Testament sense means that every individual as 
an individual shall relate himself personally to Christ 
in fear and trembling through the leap of pas~ionate deci-
sion in the despair of his guilt before God.14 
Martin points out that contrasted to the anthropocentric tendencies of 
Christian theology in his day, Kierkegaard's theology stands out 
sharply as theocentric.15 These aforementioned factors all exerted 
influence upon Kierkegaard's life and work. 
But Kierkegaard also viewed ~utheranism as a corrective. 
Lutheranism is a corrective--but a corrective made into 
the norm, the whole, is eo ipso con:f'using in the neJC1; 
generation (when that which it was meant to correct no 
l4Ibid.: pp. 39, 40. 
l5Ibid., p. 40. 
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longer exists). And as long as this continues things 
get worse with every generation, until in the end the 
correcti ve produces tbe exact opposite of what was 
origi nally intended.16 
This view would explain the constant reference to Roman Catholic 
dogma in the presentation of Luther an t heology. However, when 
Kierkegaard applies this standard to Luther an theology he lays himself 
open to like application. His verdict on Lutheran theology in his 
day was negative, "Taken by itself, as the whole of Christianity, 
the Lut hern corrective produces the most subtlety~ of worldiness 
. 17 
and paganism." Let's see how his theology fares. 
Kier kegaard's dialectical presentation of his thought leaves 
him vulnerable to various interpretations. In this ch~pter we will 
note how he has been misunderstood as well as understood. The fact 
t hat Kier kegaard is more concerned with describing true "religiosity11 
t han with defining doctrine makes this task difficult. Thomte 
observes: 
In Kierkegaard the approach to religious faith is sub-
j ective. His focus is not doctrine but reli giosity. · 
His emphasis is on the act of faith rather than the 
object of faith. Religiosity and inwardness are not sub-: 
ject to objective scientific research, hence th~ scienti-
fic method cannot be the nonn of Christianity.ltl 
16icierkegaard, The Journals, pp. 232, 233. 
l7Ibid., p. 233. 
18Reidar Thomte, Kierke aard's Philosooh; of Reli ion (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19 9, 
referred to as Thomte, Philosophy. 
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The Consciousness of Sin 
This writer suspects that Kierkegaard would object to his attempt 
to treat sin as a concept, and insist that it be considered as an 
existential reality since all men are involved in it. Likewise, this 
same concern could be expressed toward selfhood, freedom, and faith. 
Kierkegaard points out the danger of assuming that in the act of comp-
rehension we stand above the position we compreheild.19 Aware of this 
danger, we begin with Kierkegaard's thinking on the "consciousness 
of sin. 11 
The "consciousness of sin" is the distinguishing category in 
Kierkegaard's thinking. It is the dividing line between paganism 
and Christianity. Only a Christian can realize that his guilt is 
sin. If this were a philosophical enterprise, the logical concept 
to consider first would be Kierkegaard's understanding of "selfhood, 11 
but since ours is a theological inquiry we begin with the conscious-
ness of sin. Kierkegaard would appreciate our beginning here, for 
he wrote: 
The concept by ·which Christianity distinguishes itself' 
most decisively from paganism is the concept of sin, 
doctrine of sin; and therefore Christianity also assumes 
quite consistently that neither paganism nor the natural 
man knows what sin is; yea, it assumes that there must be 
a revelation from God to make manifest what sin is.20 
19
s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto 
Death, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1941), p. 227. Herea~er referred to 
as Kierkegaard, ~ or Sickness. · 
20Ibid., p. 220. 
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To comprehend the consciousness of sin it is necessary to under-
stand Kierkegaard's distinction between immanent religiosity and 
transcendent Christianity. To this we now turn. 
The Distinction between Immanence and Transcedence 
Kierkegaard makes a sharp distinction between what he terms 
Religion "A," which is an immanent religiosity that p_resupposes the 
immanence of truth in the human subjectivity, and Religion "B" which 
is "paradoxical Christianity." In Religion "A" moral and religious 
life can be integrated by means of inner effort within the personality. 
However, in Religion "B" or Christianity the presupposition is that 
human subjectivity is not truth, but untruth. In the realm of trans-
cedent Christianity inner effort within the personality can only 
result in a consciousness of the absolute gulf between man and Gcd. 
Hence Christianity affirms that the personality can only be brought 
to soundness by the revelation of God in history. Religion "A" has 
a plus at the foundation of human nature, whereas Religion "B" or 
21 Christianity has a minus. "The paradoxical religiousness breaks 
with immanence and ma.ltes the fact of existing the absolute contra-
22 diction, not within immanence, but against immanence." 
Failure to recognize this distinction is the cause of much 
misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's writings. Kierkegaard's 
21Thomte, Philosophy, p. 87. 
22
s~ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific. Postscript, trans-
lated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1941), p. 507. 
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Edifying Discourses written in his early period are directed toward 
the religiosity of irrananence, not Christianity. Kierkegaard began 
with the realm of immanence because in his judgment this is where 
natural man is, for apart from God's revelation no one enters into the 
reality of paradoxical Christianity. 
Nevertheless, even in Religion "A" or immanence man experiences 
resignation, suffering, and guilt. Even in innnanent religiousness 
Kierkegaard does not get away from the thought of inherited sin. 
religious healing God is the actor, though the healing is brought 
about by man's own effort. 
It is God Himself who best. knows how to utilize a man's 
mm anxieties for the purpose of extirpating all his 
self-confidence; and when he is about to sink down into 
his mm nothingness, it is again God Himself who can best 
keep him from continuing to maintain a ~3ver's under-water connection with his earthly self. 
Kierkegaard maintained that God does not reveal Himself in the 
objective world round about us; but He reveals Himself as the founda-
tion for the subjective. Therefore with regard to inunanent religious-
ness Kierkegaard makes the oft misquoted statement "truth is subjec-
t . ·t 1124 l.VJ. y. . 
Kierkegaard's novel approach toward the religion of immanence 
has a purpose. He encourages man to follow this path betting t!'.at 
23s~ren Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses, translated by David F. 
Swenson and Lillian l<1'.arvin Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing 
House, 1945), II, 132. 
24iuerkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 169-224. 
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he will confront the deadend of the qualitative difference between God 
and man, a difference which is sin. Instead of cautioning people 
against the path of immanence, Kierkegaard waves them on so that they 
might come to the contradiction and realize the importance of a 
religiosity of immanence. In his aesthetic and ethical writings 
Kierkegaard points out that living in immediacy and living by the 
· un iVersal leaves one is despair. Thus he encourages: 
Choose despair, for despai r itself is a choice; for one 
can doubt without choosing to, but one cannot despair 
without choosing. And when a man despairs he chooses 
again--and what is it he chooses? He chooses himself, 
not in his innnediacy, not as this fortuitous in~5vidual, but he chooses himself in his eternal validity. 
In .other ·words, until natural man realizes. the fallacy o:f clinging 1 
to immanence he cannot come to faith in the Christian sense. Despair 
conditions man for the "leap o:f :faith." [lhomte summarizes it best 
·when he writes: 
The deeper the individual ·whose religiosity is human enters 
into the God-relation, the more conscious he becomes of 
the fact that he is bound in the finite. His experience 
is paradoxical for the closer he gets to the Absolute the 
more he realizes how distant he is :from it. Progress here 
is tantamount to retrogression. He is unequal to the 
task and the result is guilt-consiousness. This :fonn of 
religiosity moves entirely within the realm of immanence; 
there is therefore in this no breach with_nature. 
On the other hand: 
The Christian religiosity or the paradoxical religiosity 
is altogether transcendental. It is based on the supposi-
tion that human nature is "the untruth," and that 
25s~ren Kierkegaard, Either/0~, translated by Walter Lowrie 
{New York: Double Dey & Company, Inc., Anchor Books, 1944), II, 215. 
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personality a s such has become invalidated. There is thus 
a definite breach between the Eternal and the human nature. 
This religiosity is characterized by the fact that the 
Divine has appeared in time and in historic fo~ of EE!:. 
single individual in the personality of Jesus.2 
When an adherent of Religion "A" recognizes the breach between 
himself and the Eternal God, then 
the consciousness of guilt is heightened to sin-conscious-
ness t hrough the discovery that there has been an alteration 
of human nature itself so that the truth is no longer found 
wit hin but outside the personality. Sin-consciousness is 
the only means of entrance to Christianity.27 
Kierkegaard urges the natural man to choose himself, that is to 
natural man ma:y find himself as an "individual" and thus be open 
to God's revelation. Kierkegaard's position here seems analogous to 
that of Elijah urging on the proph~ts of Ba'al.28 
Kierkegaard desperately wants the natural man to realize who 
he really is, _and what his relati onship to God is. He does not imply 
t hat natural man has the pO'wer to believe as an act of his vi.11. He 
clearly states, "faith is a miracle," and "faith begins where thinking 
26.rhomte, Philosophy, p. 213. 
27Ibid., p. 2l4. 
28r Kings 18. 
53 
leaves off." Furthermore, faith is not renunciation but affirmation. 
"By f aith Abraham did not renounce his claim on Isaac, but by faith 
he got Isaac."29 Kierkegaard held that in life every movement which 
brings about real change is a leap or act of freedom. 30 
We set out in this section to describe the consciousness of 
sin according to Kierkegaard. It must seem that we have taken a long 
detour int o the distinction between Religion "A" and Religion "B, ". 
immanence and Christianity. This detour was necessary as noted by 
the distinction made by Thomte31 on the previous page. The natural. 
man clinging to his immanent religiosity can acquire a sense of guilt, 
but he can not know that he is a sinner. This is why Kierkegaard 
can assert that the "concept of sin" distinguishes Christianity 
most decisively from paganism. 32 Thus Kierkegaard affinns: 
The individual is unable to acquire Sin-Consciousness by 
hi msel f , as he can guilt -consciousness; for in guilt-
consciousness the identi ty of the subject ~Ti.thin himself 
is preserved, and guilt-consciousness is an alteration 
of the subject ~Ti.thin the subject himself; sin-conscious-
ness, on the other hand, is an alteration of the very 
subject M.mself, which shows that outside of the individual 
that power must be which makes clear to him the fact that 
in coming into life he has become another than that he 33 
wa~, has become a sinner. This power is the Deity in time. 
29Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 77, 64, 59. 
30Thomte, Philosophy, p. 58. 
31-supra, p. 52, n. 27 
32supra, p. 48, n. 20. 
33ia.erkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 517. 
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The foregoing should suffice to demonstrate the sharp distinction 
which Kierkegaard makes between the religiosity of immanence and 
paradoxical Christianity. 
Selfhood 
In the Confessions we discovered a pervading influence that 
consistently viewed man as the creature and God as the Creator. Since 
the Fall man is a corrupted creature, unable to initiate communion 
with God, lost apart from God's grace and faith which God works in 
man to apprehend His grace. The perspective of the Confessions moves 
from God to man. Kierkegaard reverses the approach. His perspective 
is introspective. Because Kierkegaard deviates from the traditional. 
approach, because he views man dialectically, and because some fail 
to keep his distinction between the religiosity of immanence and 
transcedent Christianity in min~ he can be misunderstood. 
s. U. Zuidema's verdict on Kierkegaard's understanding of man 
is an apt illustration. 
Human existence is, therefore, a free spontaneous inner 
act; it is man's free realization of himself. In and 
through such voluntary acts man is his own "father. 11 His 
life lies in his own hands. In freedom he disposes .of his 
Ol·m future and his own future being; in free self- · 
actualization he is the free cause of his "becoming. 11 
The transition from a possible to a real act is the result 
of an act of choice. At the basis of the whole of human 
existence lies a choice made by the self. 
Human freedom, as the director of self-realization, has 
within its own typical existential pathos, its own 
existentia;L passion. This passion is connected with "the 
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f act " that man is simultaneously finite and infinite, 
temporal and eternal, reul and ideal, relative and 
absol ute. Man is a tension between finitude and infinity, 
between temporality and eternity, between the relative 
and t he absolute, and as such he is simultaneously the 
uni ty and the opposition, the contact and the conflict, 
t he synthesis and the struggle between these intrinsic 
polar opposites. Human ·existence consists of this 
tension; its task as finite existence is to realize 
itself as an infinite self, to extend its bounds beyond 
all limits, thereby tra.~scending all finiture. This 
director of human existence gives human passion its 
i mpetus, making it into an infinite passion. It arouses 
an existential dialectical movement through which self-
deni al (denial of one's self as finite), is simultaneously 
self-e.lection ( choice of one's self as infinite), self-
disclosure is concurrently self-affirmation, and existential 
spontaneity is sel f -transcedence, in which man climbs 
above himself. Man's passion may be described as his 
anxious concern to attain his own4infinity, his absolute self, and his eternal salvation.3 
T'nis parody of Kierkegaard demonstrates that Kierkegaard's 
dialectical view of the self needs to be approached with care. 
Unlike traditi onal understanding pf man, Kierkegaard posits 
freedom as anterior to self'hood. Freedom is the catalyst vherein 
selfhood becomes possible. It is his contention that no one can 
know the meaning of his ovn existence except from the perspective 
of revelation. Hence his emphasis focuses on the individual and what 
it means to exist coram Deo. 
Man is indeed, a synthesis of time and eternity. He stands at 
the junction of nature and spirit. He is a riddle to himself. He 
is bound and yet free. His existence is a paradox. Kierkegaard 
34s. u. Zuidema, Kierkegaard, translated by David H. Freeman 
(Gran~ Rapids: The Baker Book House, 1960), pp. 15, 16. 
contends that paradox is the category which expresses the relation-
shi p between man and God. If one leaves God out of the picture, then 
man can be understood in some other way. But to do so falsifies man's 
self-understandi'ng. If one makes God immanent, and thus resolves the 
paradox, then God is misunderstood. If one misunderstands God, one 
eo i pso misunderstands man.35 
The paradox of human existence is best sunmiarized by this state-
ment: Man is absolutely free and at the same time man is absolutely I 
determined.36 Man is part of nature and thus of its chain of· 
determinacies--that is his involvement in time. Yet man stands 
outside of this stream in the transcendence of his freedom. With the 
mystery of his free will he can break the chain and control his destiny, 
as it would appear to him and as he would like it to be absolutely.37 
He is not unwittingly carried along in a determined pro-
cess like a twig in a torrent, nor is he safely guided by 
instinct like the bird that builds its nest in the spring. 
He is called upon to guide his own destiny and yet he is 
unable to do so. It is out of this anxiety (or dread) 
which is the constant concomitant of hi~8freedom that both creativity and rebellion are born. 
35Martin J. Heinecken, The Moment Be:fore God (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 153. Hereaf'ter referred to as Heinecken, 
Moment. 
36Ibid., p. 154. 
37rbid., p. 165. 
38:rbid. 
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For Kierltegaard "dread before nothingness" is the constant concomi-
tant of freedom in human existence and the psychological state out of 
which sin is born. If man were a beast or an angel, he would not be 
able to be in dread. But since man is a synthesis of eternity and 
t ime; since man stands at the juncture of nature and spirit he can be 
in dread, and the greater the dread, the greater the man.39 
Kierkegaard does not operate ,Tith n simple body-soul dualism, 
assigning to the soul rational powers, v:i.e•,ring it as the essence of 
wan and giving it an essential freedom o~posed by the body as a 
restricting factor. If Kierkegaard had assumed this view, then 
man's predicament would be merely his involvement infinitude, his 
imprisonment in the body. To the extent then that man could free 
himself from the limitations of his body, to that extent he would 
be free. Absolute freedom comes when the soul leaves the body if 
one accepts this approach. But, 
. This would be granting to the soul an essential autonom;y 
and freedom, such as on Kierkegaard's view, only God 
possesses. Such a being would overcome the dread of its 
existence precisely to the degree that it recovered its 
autonom;y and asserted its own freedom. In Kierkegaard45 view, this is precisely vrhat the human self cannot do. 
vrnat then is the self? To understand this it is necessary to 
combine what Kierkegaard says about the n~ture of selfhood in The 
39Ibid., p. 166~ 
40Ibid., p. 169. 
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Si cknes s unto Death ,Tith what he says about the dread as the 
psychological state preceding the leap into sin in The Concept of 
Dread. 
Man i s spirit. But ·what is spirit? Spirit is the self. 
But what is the self? The self is a relation which re-
l at es i t se)..f to its own self, or it is that in the 
r el ation [i.,hich accounts for it] that the relation relates 
i t sel f to its o,m self; the self is not the relation but 
[consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself 
t o its own self.41 
Although at first this statement sounds as though someone 
scrambled the words in translation, it means that human beings are 
different f rom animals in that they can recognize their o,m selfhood. 
A horse f or example can not contemplate the advantages of being·· a 
horse r at her t han a mule. As human beings we can stand outside ourselves 
and contemplate ourselves. This is possible because: "Man is a syn-
t hes is of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the 
eternal, of f reedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. 1142 Hence 
t he self is that which is capable of relating to itself, a center of 
cont empl at i on and responsibility. In the human self this self is 
inseparable from the synthesis of the temporal and eternai. 43 
Kierkegaard regards the human self as a creature of God, a derived 
and dependent self. In fact, he asserts that a healthy· ·relationship to 
41K1erkegaard, The Sickness unto Deat h, p. 146. 
42Ibid. 
43Heinecken, Moment, p. l7l. 
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t he self requires recognition of man's dependent relationship to God. 
Thus he affirms: "The self ca.nnot of itself attain and remain in 
equilibriu.~ and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that 
Power which constituted the whole relation. 1144 Hence the God-relation-
shi p must be right if the relationship of the self to itself is to be 
right. This appears to be Kierkegaard's equivalent of Saint 
Augustine's "lvla:-i's soul is restless until it rests in God." Failure 
to ground our life in God as the Power that posits it is despair 
whether recognized or not.45 
The ver-y fact that man can despair is indicative of his superiority 
over animals . The consciousness of despair is the first step toward 
effecting a cure. The cure is faith in the atonement. 46 
Consequently, I4erkegaard posits that the "self is the conscious 
sY1:thesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to itself, 
whose task is to become a self, a task which can be performed only 
by means of a relationship to God. 1147 To this he adds: "The self is 
in sound health and free from despair only when precisely by having 
been in despair, it is grounded transparently in God. 1148 · 
4~ierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 147. 
45Ibid. 
46Heinecken, Moment, p. 175. 
47Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 162. 
48Ibid., p. 163. 
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For Kierkegaard the self has infinite significance because its 
measure is God. Consci ousness of God is necessary before the self 
recogni zes its i nfinitude. Hence: 
The mor e conception of God, the more self; the more self, 
the more conception of God. Only when the self as this 
de f inite individual is conscious of existing before God, 
onl y t hen is it t he infinite self; and then this self 
s ins before God.49 
This introduces us to Kierkegaard's dialectical view of the self. 
A self t hat is in one sense completely free whereas it is completely 
determined. Human existence is a paradox. 
Freedom 
Dread is the inescapable concomitant of freedom. Dread is 
possible only for human beings who are syntheses of eternity and time~ 
Only dependent selves are capable of dread. God is not in dread, for 
He is the ground of hi s ovm being. But ·we who are subject to both 
freedom and necessity are in dread. 
It is thus that dread is the psychological state preceding 
the "leap" into sin. The biblical story of the fall into 
si n is to be interpreted in this "!.·Tay. Adam' S story is to 
be regarded as the c onnnon htunan story. It is not to· be an 
explanat ion of how sin crone into the ,mrld out of an original 
state of abstract freedom and original integrity. Sin 
al ways enters by a leap out of the psychological state of 
dread. Furthermore, sin always presupposes itself, so that 
you cannot put your finger on the state of innocence, either 
in the history of the individual or in the history of the 
49Ibid., p. 211. 
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race. It is always the man ,iho is guilty already, who 
has already lost his innocence, who begins wondering 
about the origin of sin.50 
Here again in Heinecken's sympathetic approach to Kierkegaard 
we see how ine:Ktricably sin, particularly original sin, and human 
freedom are bound together. We noted this to be the case in the 
Confessions understanding of free will. But Kierkegaard's under-
standing of the Fall definitely departs from traditional orthodoxy. 
In his view, Adam does not stand apart from the human race completely 
free and innocent, capable of choosing equally either good or evil. 
This would presuppose a knowledge of good and evil which Adam did 
not have until af'ter the Fall as the biblical account pictures it. 
Prior to his choice Adam could have no knowledge of the meaning of 
either the tempt~r's spurious promise or God's threat. Hence 
Kierkegaard reinterprets the fall. To do so, Kierkegaard attempts 
to project himself into Adam's position prior to the fall. 
This state he claims is analogous to the psychological state 
preceding any choice. This is the state of being aware of freedom, 
of the ability to act, to choose without having yet ma.de the choice. 
This state is dread, anxiety, the object of which is precisely the 
unknmm. It is the dread of "nothing," the awareness of the alarming 
possibility of being able. Of what he is able man has no knowledge. 
To suppose he has, is to presuppose what comes later, the distinction 
50Heinecken, Moment, p. 175, 176. 
62 
between good and. evil. 5l Thus Kierkegaard terms dread 11sympathetic 
antipathy and antipathetic sympathy11 by which he means that we are both 
attracted and repelled by the possibility. Heinecken sums up Kierke-
gaard's view when he writes: 
Thus out of the state of dread, which is the constant 
concomitant of freedom, sin is born. It is not given with 
existence. Man is not created a sinner, but he is created 
a self--a synthesis of freedom and necessity in dread of 
the possibilities his freedom opens before him. Thus he 
stands at the place of decision and, since he is a depen-
dent being, his well-being really depends upon his surrender 
to the being upon whom he depends. I:f he properly surrendered 
in trust all would be well with him. But as a matter of 
f act he does not. Therefore every human being is aware o:f 
the sinister contradiction with himself: He is aware o:f his 
guilt in some measure or other, he is aware of his insecurity, 
he is aware of his limitations, and he t ries frantically 
to overcome them. He is thus always trying to live out of 
hi mself and the world, out of his :finitude, out of his self-
sufficiency. He is asserting himself in pride and is mis-
trustful of the limitations that are placed upon him. Thus 
life circles about himself. This would be well enough, if 
he really were his own center. But since he is a sel:f 
constituted by another, this notion about himself throws him 
horribly out of kilter. This is the state in which every man 
is found, having entered into it
5
~ an inexplicable leap out 
of the dizziness of his freedom. . 
Thus if Heinecken's observation is valid, Kierkegaard views 
freedom as the medium through which man sins and through which he 
comes to a consciousness of his sin and is thus reclaimed by God. 
51s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 40. Hereaf'ter 
referred to as Kierkegaard, Dread. 
52Heinecken, Moment, p. 179. 
Martin observes that 
Kierkegaard was a passionate apostle of ma.n's individual 
freedom. But he perceived that the relation of faith to / 
freedom is a highly dialectical one. The act of Christian 
faith is a personal decision of the human will; but, at I 
the same time, it is more. It is conditioned by the divine r' 
determ:i.nation of the individual thr ough the Holy Spirit. 
"No man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy f 
Ghost" (1 Corinthians 12:3). In this, the act of faith I 
corresponds to the paradoxical nature of the object of 1 
faith, so that, from the hUJ11.an side, Christian faith is \ 
an act of human decision; while, from the Divine side, \ 
it is the free gift of God's grace.53 
There can be little doubt about Kierkegaard's dialectical under-
standing of human freedom. Like sin, freedom is because it is. 
There can be no logical explanation for it. The opposite of freedom 
is not necessity, but ultimately guilt. 
When sin is posited in the particular individual by the 
qualitative leap, the distinction is then posited between ...\1 
good and evil. We have nowhere been chargeable with the I ·"-
foolishness of thinking that w.an must sin; on the contrary, 
we have everywhere protested against"every sort of merely 
experimental knowledge, and have said, what we here again 
repeat, that sin presupposes itself, just as freedom does, 
and cannot be explained, any more than freedom can, by an..v 
antecedent. To let freedom commence as a liberum arbitrium 
(which nowhere is to be found, as Leibnitz says), which is 
quite as free to choose the good as the evil, is to ma.~e 
ever-y explanation radically impossible. To talk about good 
and evil as objects of freedom is to finitize both freedom 
and the concepts of good and e1~· Freedom is infinite and 
does not arise out of anything. 
This approach to freedom makes speculation about its origin out 
of bounds to reason, for reason certainly is not infinite. The 
5~rtin, The Wings of Faith, p. 93. 
54iu:erkegaard, Dread, p. 100. 
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"religious genius" may by turning inward discover guilt e.nd freedom, 
not freedom to do this or that in the world, but "freedom to know 
of himself that he is freedom." However, 
In t he degree that he discovers freedom, in that same 
degree does the dread of guilt in the condition of possi-
bili ty i mpend over him. Guilt only does he fear, for 
t hat is t he one and only thing that can deprive him of 
f reedom. It is easily seen that freedom is not defiance 
by any means, or the selfish liberty understood in a finite 
sense. By such an assumption (that of liberum arbitri~ 
t he effort has o~en been made to explain the origin of sin. 
That, however, is labor lost, for the assumption of' such a 
presupposition presents a greater difficulty than that 
which it would explain. W'nen freedom is so interpreted, 
i ts opposite is necessity, which shows that freedom has 
been construed under an intellectual category. No, the 
opposite of freedom is guilt, and it is the supreme glory 
of f r e edom that it has only with. itself to do, that it 
projects guilt in its possibility and also posits it by 
itself, and if guilt is posited actually, freedom still 
posits it by itself. If one does not give heed to this, 
then one has confounde~ freedom with something entirely 
different, with force.55 
Here we see the consistency of Kierkegaard. He has given the 
self a religious orientation and now he gives freedom this same 
religious orientation. Freedom is an existential category, not 
merely an intellectual one. As such it is not a logic·al concept, 
but a condition describing and defining existence. Kierkegaard's 
concept of freedom lies beyond the reach of logical analysis in the 
realm of the spirit. Hence he adds: 
When freedom then fears guilt, it is not that it fears 
to recognize itself as guilt, if it is guilty, but it fears 
· to become guilty, and therefore, so soon as guilt is 
55Ibid., p. 97. 
posited, freedom comes back again as repentance. But 
meanwhile freedom's relation to guilt is a possibility. 
• • • Only by itself can freedom learn 5g know whether it is f reedom or guilt which is posited. 
Dread, already described as a concomitant of freedom, shows itself 
as a "dizziness" in the practical psychological functioning of freedom 
in the life of ~.an . 
Thus, dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when 
the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then 
gazes do~m into its o\m possibility, grasping at finiteness 
to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs. 
Further t han this psychology cannot 60 and will not. 
That very instant everything is chanGed, and when freedom 
rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two 
instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or 
can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as 
ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be •••• Psy-
chologi cally speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in 
impotence. s·r 
This is not an attempt to explain tne origin of human freedom, 
rather it is an attempt to describe its symptoms in our existence. 
It leads us back into the reaJJn of the spirit. Kierkegaard observes 
at the conclusion of his study on dread that as soon as psychology 
has finished with dread it must deliver it over to dogmatics. For 
"he who with respect to guilt is educated by dread will therefore 
repose only in atonement." 58 
Kierkegaard's concept of hUIJ".an freedom is clarified by this 
comment from Thomte: 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid., p. 55. 
5Sibid~, p. 145. 
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Freedom does not consi st i n being eC;_11ally able to choose 
good and evil. Good and evi l are r.o~ regarded as deter-
mi nants of freedom but as derivatives. First, "when sin 
is _posited in the particu.1.:-.r by the qualitative leap, the 
distinction is then posit(; .... oetween good and evil. 11 Bohlin 
points out the difference between Kant's and Kierkegaard's 
conception of freedom. For Kant the result of the ethical 
striving of t he will is a progression toward ethical per-
fection. For Kierkegaard the result of the same striving is 
a consciousness of guilt which rnakes it apparent that the 
salvation resulting in a new life must come 5~rough a spiritual ;;,ower which is greate·r than man I s. 
Hu.man freedom for Kierkegaard is the context of our life in 
which God brings us to an awareness of our sin and impotence. And 
it is God who is the teacher. 
T'ne Teacher is then God himself, who in acting as an 
occasion prompts the learner to recall that he is in 
Error, and that by reason of his 01-.rn guilt. But this 
state, the being in Error by reason of one 1g0o,m guilt, 
what shall we call it? Let us caJ.l it Sin. 
This brings us full circle, back to the consciousness of sin. 
We wa.>1t to look at sin now not as an act of willful disobedience, 
but as a condition of our existence. 
Sin--Fallen Freedom 
The Confessions make a distinction between the creature and the 
creature's corruption due to sin. Kierkegaard's dialectical approach 
at times seems to equate finitude with sin, but this is not so. Rather 
59Thomte, Philosophy, p. 167. 
60s~ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, translated by David 
F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), p. 10. 
he maint ains that everyone who exists is a sinner because man 
abused his freedom. Man does not sin from necessity--this is 
has 
a con- / 
I 
tradiction. He sins only in freedom. This is part of his definition. 
Given with existence are two possibilities: 
The one is the leap into sin, the grasping to finitude in 
the assertion of a false independence: the other is the 
surrender in faith. It is the failure to surrender in 
faith that constitutes man a sinner and makes him guilty.61 No one has said this more unequivocally than Kierkegaard. 
But such a position is paradoxical. It defies systematization. 
It proposes an existential sit uation which can only be recognized by 
one who has experienced what it means to be a sinner in the light of 
Christ. Thus Kierkegaard holds that it is only as man is confronted 
by the love of God in Christ that he recognizes the f'u1.J. dimension 
of his sin. 
Even in the subsequent state of sin dread remains. The fall into 
sin is not just a past event, but a constantly recurring action in 
the life of each individual. Everyone is confronted by two possi-
bilities of existence, either to receive his life from God in trust, or· 
to assert himself in a false independence. This is the constant 
threat or "crisis11 in which man stands before the abyss, the threat 
of meaninglessness and insecurity, from which a man is always tempted 
to escape into something that he can control and manipulate.62 
61Heinecken, Moment, p. 183. 
62Ibid., p. 184. 
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Heinecken sunnnarizes the nature and function of dread in these 
words: 
Dread is the dizziness of freedom which is the constant 
concomitant of the freedom of the self which is a synthesis 
of freedom and necessity. Out of this psychological state 
sin is born 'by a leap. This dread is dread of the unknown, 
of the mere possibility of being able, out of which state 
a man grasps at finitude or overreaches himself in some wa;y 
and finds that he is guilty, that he is in contradiction 
with himself and the author of his being. After having 
thus become a sinner a person is educated by dread more and 
more. That is to say, the possibilities of his freedom 
are explored imaginate1y6 ... The only escape from dread is in faith •••• 3 
It will prove helpful to keep this summary definition in mind so 
that dread is not confused with despair. Dread is not itself sin, but 
despair is? Dread is the antecedent state to despair or sin. Dread 
has to do with ignorance, sin has to do with knowledge • 
. Just as the self was involved in dread so the self is also involved 
in despair or sin. For Kierkegaard the true self exists only in the 
consciousness of its dependent relationship to God. This he calls 
being "grounded transparently11 in God or t he Power who posits our 
life. The ll;rans:9arency" is the awareness of' God as the source of our 
existence, and the rejection of self-deception. "The self no longer · 
mistrusts or misconstrues this Power, he rests in it as an inexhaustible 
wellspring of boundless ~d unconditional love. 1164 
The self is confronted with choice, the "either or"--faith or sin. 
63Ibid., p. 186. 
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~-, p. 188, 189. 
But the self is already in sin. And this is a bondage from which the 
self is impotent to achieve release. This is the inescapable lot of 
man . He cannot get around it no:c can he get out of it. To· get out of 
it he would have to get rid of himself. To attempt to evade it, 
falsifies his relationship to God upon ·which his relationship to him-
sel f depends . Paradoxically, man retains the freedom of his wilful 
self - assertion without being able through self-assertion to become 
his true sel f . To become this, he must surrender his autonomy and 
find his true f reedom in God who loves and accepts him.65 This dove-
t ails wit h Kierkegaard's observation recorded in his Journals: 
The most tremendous thing which has been granted to man 
i s : t he choice, freedom. And if you desire to save it 
and preser ve it there is only one way: ih the very same 
second unconditionally and in ~omplete res~nation to 
give it back to God, and yourself ,,Tith it. 
"'!an can be in despair/sin vTithout being conscious of it. There 
are vari ous kinds of despair, such as despai r of infinity, despair of 
f initude, despair of possibility, fatalism, and others. They all 
represent the logical pos·sibilities that stem from the nature of man's 
self es a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of possibility and 
necessity. 
Man's basic sin is his failure to recognize his dependence upon 
God and hence his ref'usal to live out of God. Instead substitutes 
65Ibid., .p. 189. 
66Robert Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1951), p. 428. 
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like self, world, flesh, and law replace God. This is the despair of 
weakness ·which can be silllll'llarized under the category of s·elf-acceptance: 
This whole matter of the despair cf weakness can be reduced 
to the question of self-accepta.~ce. It is not just a matter 
of accepting what fortune .gives or denies to you, because 
then a man ·would be falling in and out of despair with the 
changes of fortune. It is a matter of accepting oneself 
as a limited and finite self, just as one is, while never 
forgetting the possibilities of the infinite. In order to 
do this properly, however, one must
6
see oneself as not~ing 
before God and yet accepted of him. 7 
Kierkegaard expresses the connection between despair and sin in 
this way: 
Sin i s this: before, ••• to be in despair at not 
willing to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be 
oneself. Thus sin is potentiated wea.lmess or potentiated 
defiance: sin is the potentiation of despair.68 
Since Kierkegaard views human existence as existence before God, 
sin has grave consequences. A cl~ar conception of God underlines the 
harsh reality of human sin, for only as 'we know God's love in Christ 
can we really recognize sin's seriousness. Sin, therefore, is 
never merely the breaching of an impersonal law, but it is always before 
God. T'.nis emphasis is refreshingly like Luther. 
The self is always before God, and apart from faith the self' is 
in despair. Since the self is before God, the despair in which the 
self exists is also before God. · This is the condition out of which 
sinful acts are born: 
67Heinecken, Moment, p. 2o8. 
~ierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 208. 
Nor is it only now and then one sins before God; for every 
sin is before God, or rather it is this which properly makes 
hu.Tl!E.n guilt to be sin. 
Despair is potentiated in proportion to consciousness of 
self; but the self is potentiated when God is the measure. · 
The more conception of God, the more self, the more self, 
the more conce:ption of God. Only ·when the self as this 
definite individual is conscious of existing before God, 
only then i~ it the infinite self; and then this self sins 
before God. 9 
The Confessions view original sin as the ignorance of God. 
Kierkegaard too attempts to relate sin and ignorance, but in a differ-
ent way. Heinecken sums u:p his argument in the words: 
The Socratic definition of sin is ignorance. The Socratic 
contention is that men do the wrong only because they are 
ignorant of the right, and that no one would deliberately 
do what he knows to be wrong. This raises the very 
interesting point as to how this ignorance first crune to 
be? How a nan's knowledge of the good first crune to be 
obscured? If the first time he sinned a man was not 
distinctly conscious of what he was doing, there must 
have been a prior obfuscation of this intelligence. This 
is not accounted for. If, on the other hand, he wa.s clearly 
conscious of what he was doing, either he ·would never have 
fallen into sin, or else sin must lie not in the intelligence 
but in the defiant .,ill. This is what Christianity asserts. 
If the Socratic view is correct then, by definition, sin 
does not exist at all.70 
Kierkegaard was a great admirer of Socrates, but here we see him 
parting company with his mentor because of his Christian convictions. 
Kierkegaard's view shows clearly his endeavor to place sin at the door 
of will rather than at the step of reason. 
69Ibid., p. 211. 
70 · 6 Heinecken, Moment, p. 21. 
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Kierkegaard connects sin and the will. If the Confessions regarded 
r eason anterior to will, Kierkegaard seems to reverse this order and 
make will ant ecedent to r eason . Note the progression of his logic in . 
t hi s pas sage . 
Chr i stianit y begins also in another way, by declaring that 
there must be a revelation f r om God in order to instruct 
man a s t o what sin i s , t hat sin does not consist in the 
fact t hat man has not understood what is right, but in the 
f act that he will not understand it, and in the fact that 
he ·will not do it. 
Socrates expl ains t hat he who does not do the right things 
has not understood it; but Christianity goes a little further 
back and s,ays, it is because .he will not understand it, and 
this i n turn i s because he doe s not ··rill the right. And 
in the next pl ace, desc:dbing what :properly is defiance, it 
teaches that a man does wrong although he understa.11ds what 
is right, or for bears to do rieht el.though he understands 
what is right; in short, ·the Christian doctrine of sin is 
pure impertinence against man, accusation upon accusation •••• 
But can anyone comprehend this Christian doctrine? By no 
means--this too is Christian, and so is an offence. It must 
be beli eved. Compr ehension is conterminous with man's rela-
t ion t o t he human, but faith is man's relation to the divine. 
How t hen does Christiani ty expl ain this incomprehensible? 
Quite consist ently, in an equally incomprehensible way, by 
means of the fact that it is revealed. 
So then , Christianity underst ood, sin l i es in the will, not 
in the intellect; and. this corruption of the will goes well 
beyond t he consciousness of the individual. This is the 
perfectly consistent declaration, for otherwise the question71 
of how sin began must arise with respect to each individual. 
This leaves little doubt as to the freedom Kierkegaard assigns to 
the human will in matters of faith. Natural man is free to sin, free 
to def'y God. His reason cannot even comprehend the nature and 
71Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 226. 
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significance of this defiance in relationship to God. 
Since the self is a paradox, it follows logically that sin is also 
paradoxical. Sin i.., an absolute paradox which can neither be resolved 
nor explained . It can only be acknowledged, confessed and repented of'. 
Revelation must teach us what sin is! 
No man by himself and of himself can explain what sin is, 
pr ecisely because he is in sin. All his talk about sin is 
at bottom palliation for sin, an excuse, a sinful w~tigation. 
Hence Cnristianity begins also in another way; by declaring 
that there must be a revelation from God in order to instruct 
man as to what sin is, that sin does not consist in the fact 
that man has not understood what is right, but in the fact 
that he ·will not understand it and in the fact that he will not 
do it.72 
Kierkegaard makes no apology about this position being offensive 
to ma.n's reason. He dwells on the 11offense" of Christianity and 
places it in sharp focus: 
Here again ,.~e have the criterion of t !'!e offense. The possi-
bility of the offense consists in the fact that there has 
to be a revelation from God to enlighten man as to what sin 
is and how deep it l ies. The natural man, the paga.'1, thinks 
thus: "Oh well, I admit that I have not understood everything 
in heaven and earth •••• I don't pretend to be a perfect 
man, far from it; but I know and. I am ·willing to concede how 
far I am from perfection--ought I not then to know what sin 
is?" But Christianity makes a.'1 answer, "No, that is what you 
know least about, how fe.r you are from perfection and what 
sin is. 11 Behold, in this sense, in a Christian sense, sin 
doubtless i~ ignorance; it is ignorance of what sin is. 
The definition of sin •• still needs to be completed: sin 
is, af'ter having been informed by a revelation from God what 
72rbid., p. 225, 226. 
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sin is, then before God in despair not to will to be one-
self, or before God in despair to will to be oneself.73 
Kierl<:egao.rd definitely agrees with traditional orthodoxy that 
sin is not just a negation. It's not just a lack, a weakness, 
ignorance , or finitude. It is a position. Sin is the orientation of 
J'J'l.an 's: existence . It is the inclination of his will. Since this is 
true, sin cannot be explained, but must be experienced. 
Christianity, we have insisted from the beginning, is not 
a philosophical or theological doctrine but an existential 
connnunication in which t he paradox plays an essential role. 
Though Christianity is not a doctrine, nevertheless it 
involves dogmas, the revealed dogmas, which are ·to be 
affirmed. Strictly speaking , of course, it is not the dogma 
which is believed, it is the God to whom the dogma points 
who is believed and trusted~ Nevertheless there is the 
revealed do[Wla, that which is affirmed on the basis of 
revelation.·r4 
This is how Heinecken interprets Kierkegaard. His distinction 
between dogma and doctrine seems confusing, but its validity would 
depend upon his definition. Without a doubt, Kierkegaax_-d does tie 
paradox, faith, and dogma together as the three determinants that 
stand in support of the Christian doctrine of sin and act as a bulwark 
against pagan wisdom.75 There is no denying, either, the major role 
that is played by the concept "paradox" in Kierkegaard's thought. The 
paradox must be lived and experienced, because by its very nature it 
73Ibid., p. 226, 227. 
74Heinecken, Moment, p. 222. 
75Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 227. 
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transcends our understa~ding and cannot be reasoned through or 
intellectually recognized. No one dare claim to understand and 
resolve t he mystery of his own sinfulness and the greatness of his 
mm r edemption. 
The Atonement 
The revel a·!::ion of mnn ' s involvement in sin is the ba.si s for the 
doctri ne of t he atonement. Kierkegaard points out that Christianity 
i s a t pains to establish sin so firmly that it is impossible for man 
~o rid himself of it. Man stands guilty before God and only God 
himsel f can clear him of his guilt. As he strives to rid himself o:f 
s in by his mm devices, man only compounds his predicament, working 
himsel f deeper into despair and sin. God alone can help him.76 
Fir st Chr i sti anity gees ahead and establishes sin so 
secur e l y a s a posi t i on that t he human understanding never 
can comprehend it; and t hen it is the same Christian 
doctr i ne whi ch in turn undertakes to do away with this 
position so completely that the hu-rnan underst anding never 
can comprehend it. Speculation, which chatters itself 
away fro.rn t he paradoxes, lops a little bit off at both 
ends, and so it goes easier; it does not make sin so 
entirely posit ive--and i n spite of this it cannot get it 
t hrough its head that sin should be entirely forgotten. 
But Christianity, ·which is the first discoverer of the 
par adoxes, is in this case also as :paradoxical as possible; 
it works directly against itself when it establishes sin 
so securely as a position that it seems a perfect impossi-
bility to do away with it a.gain--and then it is precisely 
Christianity which, by the atonement, would do away with 77 it so completely that it is as though drowned in the sea. 
76Heinecken, Moment, p. 222. 
77Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 231. 
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Kierkegaard could have come to this understanding from Luther's 
Small Catechi sm for certainly this emphasis is apparent in Luther's 
explanation of t he Apostl es' Creed. The cure of sin, the sickness unto 
death , comes t hrough faith in the God who i n Christ has reconciled 
the world t o Himself and who is pr esent and active in His church 
t hr ough His· s pirit. "The true image of God, true sel:fhood, true 
humanity, is attai ned when, in the proper relationship to this God, a 
man wills to be the dependent self, the sinful self, the redeemed 
sel:r.78 
The alternative to faith is offense. It is the refusal to 
accept the God who humbled himself to be the Savior of all in Jesus, 
the Chr ist. Even God Himself cannot eliminate the possibility of 
t his offense . Love cannot be forced, it must be freely given. 
I n pagani sm man made God a man (The Man - God); in 
Christianity God makes Himsel f man (The God - Man)--but 
in the infinite love of His compassionate grace He made 
nevertheless one stipulation, he can do no other. This 
is pr ecisely t he so~row in Christ, "He can do no other"; 
He can humble Hi mself, take the form of a servant, suffer 
and di e f or man, invite all to come rn1to Him, sacrifice 
every hour of the day, and sacrifice :His life--but the 
possibility of the offense He cannot take away. Oh, uniq_ue 
work of love ! Oh, unfathomable sorrow of' love! That God 
Himself cannot , as in a.11other sense He does not 1,rill, 
cannot ,·rill it, but, even i f He would, He could not make 
it impossible that thi s work of love might not turn out 
to be for a person exactly t he opposi t e , to be the extremest 
misery! For the greatest possible human misery, greater 
78Hei necken, Moment, p. 224. 
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even than sin, is to be offended in Christ and remain offended. 
And Christ cannot, "Lovell cannot render this impossible. Lo, 
for this reason He says, "Blessed is he who shall not be 
offended in me." More he .cannot do.79 
We conclude with Thomte's summary statement on Kierkegaard's 
understanding of faith, for faith alone can apprehend the atonement: 
KierkePaard maintains that faith in the Christian sense is 
neither continuous with rational belief nor to be identified 
with a spont aneous awareness of God. Christian faith is 
lithe second inunediacy" or "irnrnediacy af'ter reflection. 11 
By the term innnediacy af'ter reflection he means exactly 
what he formerly had called "repetition," namely the restor-
ation of the personality to its pristine .integrity. However, 
the immediate consciousness of God must be completely des-
troyed by the consciousness of sin before there can be any 
question of a second inunediacy of God. Only when the indi-
vidual has found himself guilty before God can he arrive at 
faith and the nzy-stic union with God in Christ. The 11reflec-
tion11 is here the precess by which the consciousness of sin 
completely destroys every possibility of finding God in 
the inunediate experience of life. 
Faith is not r egarded as a form of cognition. It is not an 
intellectual observat ion but an expression of the will. 
There is in Kierkegaard's concept of faith as well as in 
his con80pt of choice a pronounced tendency to,rard volun-tarism. At the same time Kierkegaard maintains that 
faith and the new immediacy wi th God is a divj,ne gif't. 
Faith is the transcendent point of departure.~1 
79Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 257. 
80The Lutheran Cyclopedia, p. 1113, defines "voluntarism" as 
11the opposite of intelJ.ectualism. In philosophy, the attempt to 
interpr et ultimate ITality in terms of will r ather than intellect. 
In theolo~ the basing of moral and logical distinctions on the will 
of Gon. r ather than on reason, i.e., whatever God ·wills to be so is 
on that· basis right, true, and good." Lutheran Cyclopedia, edited by 
Erwin L. Lueker (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1954), p. lll3. 
81 Thomte, Philosophy, p. 161. 
It should be pointed out that when Ki erkegaard makes faith an 
act of t he will he is consist en~, f or s i n i n his thought is also 
an act of the will, and t he opposite of s in is not virtue but faith.82 
The charge of voluntarism is frequently lodged against Kierkegaard 
and ultimately becomes a question of definition. And once the 
def ini tion is established, then one must ask: Is voluntarism any 
more a d istorti on of r eality than rationalism? · Conceivably, the 
debat e could be lengt hy. 
OBSERVATIONS 
The time has now come to knot the thread, to use a favorite 
expr es sion of Kierkegaard and attempt to make some observations on 
his thought in t he areas just treated. For perspective, Thomte 1 s 
es t imate of Kierkegaard's contribution to theology might prove 
helpf ul: 
In t he author's estimate it is Kierkegaard's contribution 
to have drawn a distinct line between all human religiosity 
of :immanence and the Chr istian religiosity of transcedence. 
The human individual does not possess the Truth, God himself 
must reveal it to him. There is in Kierkegaard's philosophy 
an absolute dualism or discontinuity between God and human 
nature. This dualism is due to the fact that man is regarded 
as a created and derived self, but more essentially it is due 
to sin which
8
is held to be a qualitative difference between 
God and man. 3 
82Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 213. 
83 Thomte, p . 214. 
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Hi st ory without question endorses Thomte's verdict on Kierdegaard's 
work. It i s this particula r emphasis which was treated under the 
sub-title "the consciousness of sin11 which has led to some remarkable 
r et hi nking of t wentieth cent ury theology. 
We began our f oray i nto Kierkegaard. with the idea expressed in 
the int r oduction t hat Kierdegaard viewed his work as a corrective 
t o rat i onalism, i dealism, and nominal orthodoxy. How does he measure 
up a~ a correct i ve? Thus Kierkegaard's o~m standard shall be the 
nonn of measurement in these brief obser vations. 
Kierkegaard 's subjective approach makes analysis difficult. 
Since he t reat s both freedom and sin as existential categories, 
pinning down his meaning i n a logica l framework meets with only 
partial success. He himself made it quite clear that a logical 
syst em i s possible but an existential system is not. 84 
T'ne s i gn i ficance of Kierkegaard's insistence on the distinction 
bet ween t he religiosity of immanence and paradoxical Christianity 
cannot be overst ated. That Kierkegaard should maintain that a 
consciousness of sin cannot be achieved by reason is a blow at 
t he heart of rationalism. Any idealistic view of man is shattered 
by the "abyss" separating man and God. Unless one is content to 
remain in the realm of immanence, Kierkegaard's argument shatters 
all human pretence and presumption. To become a Christian requires 
84Kierkegaard, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 
99-113. 
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God's a ct. To posit another way is nothing but delusion and 
unconscious despair. 
Ki erkegaa rd ' s concept of selfhood is subjective. It appears 
aptly framed , however, for who can deny t hat man is a synthesis. 
Like t he Confess i ons Ki erkegaard vi ews man as a whole rejecting 
the Greek body-soul dual i sm. One's relationship to God as the 
basis f or a he~lthy relationshi p to t he self is a valid conclusion. 
One might question t he wisdom of making one ' s consciousness of 
t he God relationship a prerequisite for pa rticipating in the 
at onement . Further study on how this position relates to infant 
baptism and t he ob j ective va lidi ty of the means of grace seems 
ca lled f or . 
Ki erkegaard adopted t his position i n opposition to the nominal 
orthodoxy of the state church where one born a Dane was automatically 
a Lutheran. Apparently Kierkegaard viewed this with the same 
feeling Lut heran theology views the ex opere operatio principle of 
Roman Catholicism. But as the "corrective" he may well overreach 
himself in his understanding of selfhood. 
Kierkegaard's concept of freedom begins with a realistic 
repudiation of the liberum arbitrium. Since this abstraction does 
not exist in reality and was devised simply so that freedom might 
be treated logically we are left with paradoxical freedom. Kierke-
gaard maintains that freedom's opposite is not necessity, but guilt 
which thrusts freedom into the realm of spirit. Good and evil for 
ar 
Kierkegaard are not determinants of f r eedom, but deri vatives. 
Freedom fonns the matrix of selfhood and of good and evil. Hence 
anxi ety or dread is a concomitant of freedom. To Kierkegaard 
freedom i s t hat which enables man to sin, but also that ·which 
enables him to recognize his sin and his need f or the atonement. 
Thi s i s the heart of Kier kegaard's thinking on freedom and its 
appeal is t hat it appears to square with our experience of life. 
I f one follows his thinking carefully one will find that Kierkegaard 
is very consistent in the application of his concept of freedom's 
paradox ica l nature. 
Sin i s t he condition of everyma.n's existence because all have 
misused f r eedom. The basic nature of sin is its refusal to 
recognize God as the ground of being. What else is this, than 
a repetition i n different terminology of the Confessional doctrine 
of the Creator--creature relationship? This was Adam's sin, 
and Adam's sin affirms Kierkegaard as a type of all men's sin. 
~ei necken's interpretation gives one some insight into the impli-
cations of Kierkegaard's understanding of the Fall. 
Moreover a state of innocence is not to be sought for 
as an actual state at the beginning of the human race. 
The so-called status integritatis, or state of integrity, 
is never an actual historical state, but is the designa-
tion of the purpose for which man was created: to take 
his life from God in trust, to come to rest in the power 
that posited him, and to become the clear qhannel through 
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which that power may flow. This was the one possi-
bility which was given a man with his exi~tence. This 
possibility was, however, never realized.~5 
We h.ive designated Kierkegaard's concept of sin as "fallen 
freedom." It is only just that we let him speak for himself con-
cerning sin's origin. 
That account in Genesis is the only dialecti'cally con-
sistent account. Really its whole substance is concen-
trated in the clause: Sin came into the world by a sin. 
I f t his were not so, then sin would have come in as 
something accidental, which man would do well not to try 
to explain. The difficulty for the understanding is 
precisely the triumph of the explanation, its profound 
consistency in representing that sin presupposes itself', . 
that it so came into the 89rld that by the fact that it is, it is presupposed. 0 
Kierkegaard takes sin out of the realm of reason. Sin is 
despair at willing to be or.e's self' or at not willing to be one's 
s e lf, naraely a fallen dependent creature of God. Sin is the 
potentiation of despair either in weakness or defiance. Sin is 
always against God and is measured by man's consciousnes~ of himself' 
Which in turn is measured by his_ consciousness of God. Kierke-
gaard's insights here are dynamic and open up a great area for 
further study. 
Thus one can see that Kierkegaard locates sin not in the mind, 
but ultimately in the will. Here he parts company with his mentor, 
Socrates. Sin, like the self is paradoxical. It cannot be 
85 · Heinecken, Moment, p. 181. 
86Kierkegaard, Dread, p. 29. 
explained, it can only be confessed and repented of. Attempts to 
explain i t always distort it because t he interpreter is a sinner 
himself. It takes a r evelation o_ ~~d to make sin known. Natural 
ma n concerned only with a rel i giosity of inunanence can comprehend 
guilt, but not sin. Sin is before God, and before one recognizes 
his guilt as sin he needs to recognize that he is a "self" before 
God. 87 
The only solution to sin i s the atonement. But the atonement 
so defies reason that man's only possible response is either 
faith or offence. Even God in His love r evealed in Christ recog-
ni zes and respects man's fallen freedom and will not coerce accep-
t ance of His solution for the liberation of man's fallen freedom. 
If one were to ask, what is the distilled essence of Kierke-
gaard1s concept of human freedom, this writer would respond: 
Freedom is the catalyst in human nature through which God works 
both the awareness of sin and the forgiveness of sin. Freedom 
is that in man which makes him liable to sin and yet subject to 
the Atonement. 
In t he next chapter an attempt at comparison of the Coni'essions' 
view of free will and Kierkegaard's position -0n human freedom will 
be made. 
87supra, pp. 72 and 73. 
CHAPTER IV 
COMPARISON OF THE T'wO POSITIONS 
-Sin with r esul tant en!'!i.~:cy a gainst God "is an inevitable 
result of t he claim to autonomy, the claim implicit in the delusion 
t ha t t here i s a "f ree will" (Liberum arbitrium). But "moral 
autonomy is destroyed as soon as there is a break with immanence 
which i s subject to the divine commandment. 111 
In t his· chapt er we reach our primary objective. Here we 
compar e t he Confessional position of Lutheranism on free will 
with Ki e r kegaard's position. We will note the general similarities 
and d i ffe rences between the two positions. · 
Introduction 
It wi ll prove helpf ul to note some general similarities bef"Jre 
we begi n consideri ng specif i c points. This will make it possible 
to see t he positions in perspective and enable us to be fair in 
our comparison. 
First, we should note that both the Confessions and Ki erkegaard 
are attempting a corrective. The Confessions present their 
positio~ i n opposition to semi-Pelagianism and synergism, striving 
for a clear distinction between civil righteousness and righteousness 
\ 1erner ·Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, translated by 
Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962), I, 
31, 25. 
before God . 2 Kierkegaard strives to be a corrective to the nominal 
orthodoxy of his day with its reduction of Christianity to a 
rationalistic system of immanence.3 Both seek to correct the same 
basic devi ation, the over-rating of reason and free will. 
Secondly, both the Confessions and Kierkegaard view man as a 
creature.4 In the. Confessions the category 11creature 11 is fundamental 
to any Christian understanding of man. Often this is taken for 
grant ed. But it may be also presupposed. In Kierkegaard there is 
11
an absolute discontinuity between God and human nature. 11 This 
is due to the fact that man is regarded as a created and derived 
self, but even more essentially it is due to sin which is held to 
be the "qualitative difference between God and man. 115 This too 
is the basic presu~position in Kierkegaard's approach to the 
iinderstanding of human nature. 
Thirdly, both the Confessions and Kierkegaard regard man as 
a whole . 6 Kierkegaard caustically inveighs against the Hegelian 
system that would consider man's thought or rationality apart from 
his existence. The wholeness of man is an important emphasis in 
2 Supra, p. 23. 
3supra, p. 53. 
4 Supra, pp. 6-9, 59. 
5Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 214. 
6 Supra, · p. 9, p. 57. 
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our day. 7 
Fina:.ly we need to note the difference in the approach between 
the two positions. The Confessions vi.-::,..; ·;;he subject of free will 
from a theological perspective. Philosophy and the problems 
posed by t he question of free will from t he philosophical per-
spective remain in t he background. 8 On the other hand, Kierkegaard 
is very much a•./'are of t he philosophical implications of his 
position. A key ·consideration in his stance is his opposition 
to the current philosophical system of his day. In summary, 
we might say that the Confessions approach the subject of free 
will from God 's point of view whereas Kierkegaard approaches it 
from man's perspective. i , . I 
Original Sin and the Consciousness of Sin 
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard treat original sin and 
free will as two sides of the same coin. The Confessions approach 
the Fall as an historical act with continuing implications. 
Kierkegaard, however, understands the Fali psychologically and views 
it dynamically as a continuing reality in the life of each individual. 
Here is an obvious difference in the two positions under scrutiny. 
In the Confessions the Fall is understood as the cause of man's 
7 
~, p. 117. 
8 Supra, p. 23. 
/ 
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natural inclination to sin. No attempt is made to psychologize 
t he Fall. The Fall is simply termed "Adam's disobedience." The 
result of the Fall is the loss of the "Imago Dei. 11 The image of 
God is equat ed with the concreated righteousness of man in his 
pristine state. It included the gifts of knowledge of God, fear 
of God, and trust in God. T'ne effect of Adam's sin is passed 
down to men by birth so that none except the Son of God can claim 
exclusion from original sin.9 
Kierkegaard, on .t he other ha~d, regards Adam's Fall as symbolic 
of everyman 's fall, although he does not regard Adam as a mytho-
loeical figure . Kierkegaard. assumes . this position because he is 
unwilling to admit that man sins from necessity. Via.n sins only 
in freedom. Given with existence are two possibilities, sin or 
faith . Hence man either seeks to assert himself in a false inde-
pendence or he accepts his life from God in trust. 10 The atmosphere 
surrounding man as he confronts this decision is one of dread 
or anxiety. Dread is the dizziness of rreedom poised on the 
precipice of choice. The dread that confronted Adam before the Fall 
confronts man as he faces the choice of his dependent and sinful 
nature before the holy and infinite God. Thus Kierkegaard posits 
for each descendent of Adam the possibility that traditional 
9 Supra, pp. 10-11. 
10supra, p. 68. 
, 8$ 
theology at t r ibuted to Adam alone. 
Thi s does not mean that Kierkegaard ascribes to each individual 
a t ime of i nnocence. No one can know what innocence is until he 
has fallen ! Hence Kierkegaard can reject the notion that both 
t he first Adam a nd any subsequent "adam" could freely choose between 
good and evil. As far as Kierkegaard is concerned, there is no 
historica l state that anyone can point to as a state of innocence •. 11 
The Confessions mention man's corporate involvement in original 
s in. 12 Kierkegaa rd does not. His concer n is with the individual. 
He is also concerned with keeping Adam a member of the human race 
and t hus subject to the a t onement made by the "last Adam," Jesus 
Christ. Here we find a significant variation in Kierkegaard's 
theol ogy and warrants further study. 
The Co~essions distinctly define t he nature and effect of 
orig i nal sin in both its positive and negative aspects. The loss 
incurred as a result of the Fall includes both the original 
relationship of harmony with and knowledge of God, and the incli-
nation to sin. Thus original sin is more than the sum total of 
man's actual sins. Even if a man were not to commit sin, he 
would still be involved in original sin. Thus no one is godly. 
Sin is ~iversa1. 13 By analogy Kierkegaard points to man's 
llsupra 
_, p. 81. 
12Supra, p. 14 
l3Ibid. 
continuing in sin as man's worst sin. He accepts the traditional 
dogma that sin is not merely a negation but a position. 14 He 
views actual sins as the outward occasicn for observing the momen-
tum of origina l sin. For Kierkegaard sin is the decisive category 
of Christianity, for sin mus t be recognized before the atonement 
has any meaning. Man's creatureliness and especially man's sin 
account for th~ infinite qualitative gulf between man and God. 15 
Like Luther and the Confessions, Kierkegaard draws no distinct 
boundary between original sin and actual sin. Pinomaa observed of 
Luther: 11There is very little difference between original sin and 
actual sin as far as Luther is concerned. 1116 In fact, Kierkegaard's 
view of the Fall appears to eliminate any practical distinction 
between original and actual sin. It would seem that Kierkegaard 
would posit actual sin as the act that catapults man into · 
solidarity with the race of sinful humanity for all do sin. On 
the other hand, the relationship between original sin and actual 
sin in the Confessions appears to be that of cause and effect. 
Actual sin is evidence of the fact of original sin. 
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard acknowledge original sin 
14
supra, pp. 68-71. 
l5Supra, pp. 66, 67. 
16Lennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, translated by Walter 
Kukkonen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 64. 
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as guilt. Kie rkegaard could hardly deny this in view of his under-
standing of t he Fall and hence of original sin. He cites with 
approval t he Smalcald Articles in The Concept of Dread: "This 
hereditary sin is so deep a corruption of human nature that reason 
cannot understand it. I~ must be believed because of the revela-
tion in t he Scriptures. 1117 
Even in t he rea lm of the religion of immanence Kierkegaard 
does not o:pera te without the concept of "original" sin. 18 However, 
in this realm man merely recognizes his guilt; he fails to see that 
his guilt is sin, namely guilt before God. 
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard emphasize the God.ward 
dimension of sin. Sin is enmity against God evidenced by such 
attitudes and actions as ignoring and despising God. The result 
is that man stands under the wrath of an angry God. 19 For 
Kierkegaard man must pass from immanence to trancendence by means 
of the qualitative leap of faith before guilt consciousness becomes 
sin consciousness. The more seriously a man takes his relation-
ship with God, the more conscious he becomes of the "abyss" created 
20 by his sin. For both Kierkegaard and the Coni'essions sin is more 
17s~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 24. 
18
supra, pp. 48-50. 
19
supra, p. 17. 
20supra, pp. 48-53. 
than a ~ere transgression of the law, it is an affront to God. 
Kierkegaard's distinction between the guilt consciousness of 
i mmanence and the sin consc iousness of Christianity indicates 
t hat he would agree with Elert's verdict: "Reason understands 
that there are offenses against God's law, but it is indifferent 
to God ' s wrath. 1121 
Ignorance of God is an aspect of original sin endorsed by 
both the Confessions and Kierkegaard but it is understood differ-
ently. The Confessions term this ignorance "the essence of original 
sin" and relate this ignorance to God.22 Kierkegaard agrees that 
sin is i gnorance, but he relates this ignorance to sin. Here he 
is consistent, for he locates sin not in the mind, but in the will.23 
Because of this i gnorance both the Confessions and Kierkegaard agree 
that it takes a revelation of God to make sin known. Thus, although 
both positions result in the same conclusion, there is a significant 
difference in the method used to reach this conclusion. 
A Co~.mon Distinction? 
Kierkegaard approaches sin from the point of view of the human 
consciousness. Because he does so, he brir.gs into focus the great 
21Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism, p. 32. 
22 Supra, p. 18. 
23
supra, p. 72. 
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contrast between what he chooses to call guilt consciousness and 
sin consciousness. He uses this subjective approach to examine 
sin in the r ealm of i mmanent religiosity. The Confessions interpret 
sin from the biblical point of view although a subjective under-
standing of the experience of sin is not absent. 
The question mark behind the heading of this section is there 
for good reaso~. It is suggested that the Confessional distinc-
tion between "civil righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" 
is matched by Kierkegaard's distinction between Religion "A" or 
irnmanent religiosity and Religion "B" or paradoxical Christianity. 
In Religion "A" Kierkegaard would adroit that reason is at the helm 
just as the Confessions acknowledge the place of reason in "civil 
righteousness." Just as the Confessions insist that reason is 
out of bounds in relation to "spiritual righteousness" so also 
Kierkegaard maintains that paradoxical Christianity is beyond the 
province of reason.24 The parallels are obvious and it appears 
valid to equate the Confessional distinction between "civil 
righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" to the distinction 
of Kierkegaard between the "religiosity of immanence" and the 
paradoxical religiosity of Christianity. The terminology is 
different, but the goal is the same. Which of these two distinc-
tions, the Confessions' or Kierkegaard's, better accomplishes the 
mission will be discussed in the next chapter. 
24 Supra, p. 32, p. 58. 
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Hence it is within the structure of this common distinction that 
we cons ider and compare the nature and function of man's free will 
or freedom . 
Comparison of "Free" Will or "Freedom" 
The Confessions allow for the functioning of free will in 
the area of "civil r i ght eousness ." The "free" will is limited, 
however, by the things that reason can grasp. In fact, the 
Apology calls "civil righteousness" the righteousness of reason. 25 
God demands this righteousness. It is necessary for law and order 
in society. Natural man retains choice in this realm, but often 
even here fails to achieve what theoretically could be achieved 
if he were a lways sub ject to reason and sound human jud@}llent. 
Sin and temptation lead him astray against his better knowledge. 
Thus one dare never predicate a man's potential for "civil 
righteousness" merely on the basis of his intellectual capacity.26 
Kierkegaard, too, maintains the possibility of choice within 
the realm of immanence. The choice, however, does not refer to 
this or that external something, but always to the choice of self • 
. Natural man can choose (will) himself. Kierkegaard encourages this 
choice. He challenges natural man. to follow his reason to the end, 
25supra 26 44 
-' p. , n. . 
26Supra., 26 p. • 
which for Kier kegaard is despair. Kierkegaard. sees the value of 
seriously seeking God, for only he who seeks seriously will 
rea lize despa iringly the "infinite qualitative distinction" 
between God and man . 27 
The Confes s ions understand the constructive contribution of 
"civil right eousness." But they also recognize the danger of 
"civil r ightec'.isness II becoming confused with the true righteousness 
of God. 28 Wherea s Kie rkegaard is certainly aware of the danger 
of a r e ligion of i rrunanence supplanting transcendent Christianity 
.. 
he neverthel ess encourages man to pursue it. (T'ois may reflect 
Kierkegaard's judgment on the nature of Christianity in his day, 
namely, that it had already surrendered to immanence.) He plays 
t he part of the devil's advocate when he insists that immanence 
be followed to its dead end. Choose despair, he urges, for then 
you have a t least the possibility of the eternal open tq you. 
It seems Kierkegaard is saying: If you are going to be religious, 
get serious about it. 29 If this interpretation is accurate, then 
he and t he Confessions agree on the importance of "civil righteous-
ness." However, again the argumentat i'on is different. Whereas the 
Confessions view "civil righteousness" as necessary for law and 
27Supra , pp. 52, 53. 
28 
28-30. Supra, pp. 
29 . 
Su:ora, p. 51. 
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order in the world, Kierkegaard sees the religiosity of immanence 
as a penultimate step toward despair and the possibility of true 
faith. 
Both t he Confessions and Kierkegaard agree that natural man 
cannot achieve righteousness before God by an act of his "free" 
will. Man 's will is impotent in spiritual matters.3~ Kierkegaard 
categorically ~enies free will because it is not a category of 
existence, that is, no one has it! No one is equally free to 
choose either good or evil. The Confessions deny freedom to the 
will in spiritual matters because Scripture denies it. Kierke-
gaard ' s approach is more philosphical. Both sin and freedom are 
infinite categories without antecedents. To attempt- to rationalize 
them is to reduce them to finitude. For him the opposite of 
freedom is not necessity, but the possibility of guilt.31 His 
treatment of free will is given in psychological terins but with 
a spiritual or religious goal. While the Confessions and Kierkegaard 
agree again in their conclusion on man's spiritual impotence in 
his natural state., the process whereby this conclusion was reached· 
in the Confessions and by Kierkegaard varies. 
The Confessions acknowledge the function of reason in the 
achievement of "civil righteousne~s," but they also provide evidence 
30
supra, p. 28. 
31
supra, 63 65 pp. - • 
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that reason is forever invading the area of "faith-righteousness." 
On the contr ary, the more zealously and diligently 
t hey wa nt to comprehend these spiritual things with 
their r easo~, t he less t hey understand or believe, 
and until t he Holy Spirit enlightens and teaches 
t hem they cons ider 1~ all mere foolishness and 
fables (F.C. II,9), 
Likewise, Kierkegaard limits reason's realm to immanence. 
Reason can not even comprehend sin~ It must be revealed by God. 
Thus sin consciousness is the distinctive category of Christianity. 
Fa ith i s God's miracle. It begins where "thinking leaves off." 
Kierkegaard locates both sin and faith i~ the will.33 The 
Conf essions indicate that the Holy Spirit enlightens and teaches 
man 's reason. The Confessions view man's reason as antecedent to 
man's will. Kierkegaard reverses this view and considers will 
as antecedent to reason. For Kierkegaard reason's function in 
the context of freedom is to lead natural man to an awareness of 
reason's finitude in the face of .God's infinitude.34 
The result of man's "freedom" is dread which anticipates guilt. 
Elert's observation on dread in Luther is very similar to Kierke-
gaard's understanding of dread.35 Despair is the condition of 
natural man at the end of his rational tether, and hence he becomes 
32supra 
_, p. 28, n. 46. 
33supra, pp. 72-74. 
34supra, pp. 7~, 75, 
35supra, p. 16. 
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open to the revelation that God's verdict on human guilt is that 
it is sin . Sin consciousness marks the end of the line for 
im.'llanence. Rationa l and ethical attempts to master God end at 
the poi nt where fuith becomes a possibility. Kierkegaard's 
conception of freedom is the very oppos ite of' Y~nt's. Kant views · 
t he result of ethical s t riving a s progression toward ethical 
perfecti on. But Kierkegaard sees the result of such striving 
to be the consciousness of gui lt which shows man that salvation 
must co~e from a power .greater than he.36 
Faith 
For the Confessions, faith is the result of the Holy Spirit's 
invasion of our lives. He moves us to knowledge of, fear of, and 
trust ·in God. How? His tools are the means of gra~e, the Word, 
Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The Holy Spirit is the energizing 
power t hat liberates the captive human will and enlightens and 
37 empowers it for obedience. 
For Kierkegaard, faith is paradoxical, an act of the will and \---· 
yet a gift of God. It is choosing to exist grounded "transparently" 
. . 
in our creator God. It is acknowledging our self as a self before 
God and Christ, with Christ being the measure of our self'. Faith 
36
supra, pp. 65, 66. 
37supra, p. 32. 
focuses in t he Paradox of Jesus Christ, the God-man, the ~ternal 
in t ime. The Atonement calls man either to faith or to offence. 
For both the Confessions and for Kierkegaard, faith marks the 
beginning of new life or existence. Authentic existence is grounded 
in f a ith, for f a ith bridges the 11abyss 11 and faith recognizes the 
38 
eternal va lidity of the self. 
· The Confessions acknowledge what might be called faith's 
ambiva l ence. It is a life characterized by repentance and for-
giveness. It is also a life engaged in struggle, a warfare of 
t he f l esh against the Spirit.39 Similarly, in Kierkegaard, 
f a ith involves man in t ension and struggle. Repentance is a 
necessary consequence of faith and is viewed as a reaffinnation 
of t he self as sinner before God, yet as a forgiven sinner in 
~hrist. 40 Agai~, although the terfilinology and reasoning.varies, 
t here is a remarkable similarity in the dynamic view of the 
Christian lif e taken by both the Confessions and Kierkegaard. 
Observations 
This writer hesitates to title this section "observations" 
lest someone quip that this study is now reduced to making 
38supra, pp. 74-76. 
39supra, pp. 33, 34. 
40 Sunra, p. 76. · 
99 
observations about observations. However, for want of a better 
term and in view of the need ~o point up a few significant 
discoveries t his section is necessary. 
In general, it is reassuring to note the great similarity 
between the Confessions ·and Kierkegaard in the conclusions reached 
on the subject of free will. This is particularly significant 
since these co1~clusions were obtained by different methodologies. 
The Confessional approach is deductive whereas Kierkegaard's 
approach was inductive. In this writer's opinion the Confessional 
position based on the authority of Scripture is complemented by 
Kierkegaard's conclusions reached by introspection and induction. 
The fact that both the Confessions and Kierkegaard reach similar 
conclusions by variant methods is indicative of the validity of 
the position. Perhaps such agreement should not surprise us since 
both. the Confessions and Kierkegaard were attempting to achieve 
the same goal. 
However, there is a decisive difference between the Confessional 
understanding of the Fall and that of Kierkegaard. The implica-
tions of this difference are reflected in Kierkegaard's concept 
of human freedom. The crux of the matter appears to be Kierkegaard's 
unwi~lingness to adroit that man sins from necessity. For 
Kierkegaard the biological category of birth does not transmit 
the spiritual determinant of sin. When Kierkegaard assents to 
the Confessional statement that "hereditary sin is so deep and 
dreadful a corruption of nature that it cannot be understood by 
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the reas on of any man but must be recognized and believed by the 
reve lation of Scri pture , 1141 he appears to be either reinterpreting 
he r editary s i n or accepting only the latter half of this Confes-
sional aff innat ion. Thus, one is faced with this question: Does 
accepting t he Conf essi onal position on original sin compel one to 
believe that man sins of necessity because of the corruption of 
h is nature? Kterkegaard would say no. 
He have nowhere been chargeable with the foolishness 
of thi nking t hat man must sin; on the contrary, we have 
everywher e prot ested against every sort of merely 
exper imenta l knowledge, and have said, what we here 
again repeat, that sin presupposes itself, just as 
f r eedom does and cannot be exp1t~ned, any more than 
freedom can, by any antecedent. 
The signi f icance of. this difference between Kierkegaard and 
t he Confess ions will be considered in chapter five. 
One fina l observation is on order before we move on to the 
next chapter. The Confessions attempt to distinguish between "civil 
righteousness" and "spiritual righteousness" without complete 
succes·s. 
43 There can be no doubt about the sincerity of the men 
who sought to make this distinction plain and unambiguous, for 
much of their argument hinged on the validity of this distinction. 
By analogy Kierkegaard also made a distinction between the 
41supra, p. 89. 
42Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 100. 
43~, p. 113. 
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the "religiosity of immanence" as opposed to the "religiosity of 
paradoxical Christianity." The Confessional categories are 
rational wher eas Kie.rkegaard 's are existential. Which can best 
carry_ the f reight is t he question to be examined also in the next 
chapter. 
,. 
CHAPl'ER V 
FINAL EVALUATION 
The work of the theologian, then is to describe the 
workings of faith, and to do so in faith's own terms; 
for wi thout a knowledge of justifying faith, in 
Dr. Pieper's word, the Bible remains "a book locked 
with seven seals. 111 
"Evaluation" is a difficult task. Objectivity is obviously called 
for, and yet some subjectivity is inevitable. Nevertheless this chap-
ter is necessary to "knot the thread" and to point to areas for 
further study. 
. A Corrective? 
Both the Confessions and Kierkegaard attempt a "corrective" when 
presenting their positions on "free" will. Both the Confessions and 
Kierkegaard sought to correct the over-rating of reason in man's 
coming into relationship with God. A corrective assumes that the 
right position does exist, but that deviation has occurred. The 
question we must ask in view of the above is: Do we need a corrective? 
To answer this question we must ask others. Can we entirely es-
cnpe rationalism, immanence, and nominal orthodoxy? Does our Synod's 
position in regard to "free" will faithfully reflect the Confessional 
1Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierke aard: A Stud in the 
History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950, 
p. 12. 
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position? Do the current doctrinal formulations of the Lutheran 
Church-~Mi ssouri Synod make use of the insights of Kierkegaard in 
the area of "free" will? Can current Lutheran theological formula-
tions continue to utilize Aristotelian philosophy as the vehicle for 
self-expr ession? 
Under st andi ng theology is more than a matter of the mind. Pinomaa 
says of Luther: 
To Luther t heology was a matter of the heart and not of 
the :i.nt ell ect. From the beginning of his theological 
endeavor he valued experience very highly. He who has 
not experienced temptation and affli ction, what does he 
know? Here we have one of the diffi cult problems of 
Luther ' s theology : he insists on an experiential basis 
of faith , yet takes a stand against natural human feelings. 
Faith' s experience of reality does not stem from natural 
hu.~an feelings but contradicts them. The saving reality 
of Christ and faith in him are in contradiction to every-
thing t hat natural man can experience on his own. They 
have to do with the reality of God, which is beyond human 
r eason .2 
In view of Luther's understanding of theology and the difficulties 
it presents to systematic theology it is not surpri~ing that Lutheran 
Confessional theology turned to Melanchthon's methodology. Pelikan 
observes that CfJ.emnitz repudiated some of "Melanchthon's theological 
vagaries, " but the "philosophy and dialectic _of Melanchthon retained 
its control of Lutheran theological formulation even after 15TI." The 
fact that Melanchthonian philosophy prevailed even after Melanchthonian 
theology had gone down in defeat is one of the ironies in the history 
2:r.ennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, translated by Walter Kukkonen 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 79. 
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of Lutheran theology. "Even the Lutheran Confessions kept Melanchthon's 
Philosophical framework almost intact. 113 The men who composed the 
Formula, for example, were trained in "Aristotelian philosophy as 
developed by Melanchthon. 114 Finally Pelikan observes:' "Thus 
Melanchthonianism was repudiated theologically, but by the work of 
Chemnitz was saved philosophically."5 Even to this day, the Aristo-
telian philosophical influence is apparent in Lutheran theological 
formulation. 6 
If Aristotelian philosophy has served adequately as the framework 
and vehicle for Lutheran theology why call it into question now? But 
has it served adequately? Pelikan observed: 
One by one, Kant's Critique does away with the elaborate 
proofs for the existence of God which Lutheran Aristo-
telianism shared with medieval scholasticism. For this 
fact, scholasticism has never forgiven Kant, and neither 
has Rationalism. But Lutheran theology can be grateful 
to him for freeing it from the onerous responsibility of 
proving by means of reason that which is known by faith 
through the forgiveness of God in the Cross of Jesus Christ. 
Th~, by proving "that all attempts to establish a 
theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, 
that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not 
conduct to any theological truths, and, consequently, 
that a rational theology can have no existence," Kant 
3Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, pp. 46, 47. 
4Ibid., p. 47. 
5Ibid., p. 48. 
-6Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950), I, II, III, passim. 
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made possible a reconstruction of the subject matter 
and method of theology that could have cleared the way 
for a recovery- of Luther's understanding of the nature 
of f aith.7 
Unfortunat ely, as Pelikan also notes, Luthern theology did not 
do t his. Thus, still today we are lef't with an Aristotelian method-
olgy which is hardly adequate to express Lutheran theology. Can 
Kierkegaard act as a corrective on our methodology? Can he provide a 
philosophy less alien to our theology, one which will express the 
basic truths of the Christian faith without rationalistic distortion? 
Pelikan answers: 
But i f the new philosophy was to do more than to give up 
one speculative system in favor of another, it had to be 
r el ated to t he basic structure of Lutheran theology and 
root ed in fai th. The only philosophical framework in 
which Lutheran theology could be recast had to be a :frame-
work derived from that t heology itself. It is this cir-
cumstance that gives meaning and relevance to the philosophy 
of S~ren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is the first Christian 
philosopher to develop a critical philosophy in the truest 
and most complete sense o:f the word. He is, therefore, the 
cli max of the development we have traced in this study. In 
him Lutheranism produced a philosopher whose thought has 
brought on a revolution in both theology and philosophy. 
But the revolution has made possible a recovery- of the 8 deep evangelical insights o:f the theology of Martin Luther. 
Perhaps we could admit the need o:f a corrective to current 
Lutheran theological methodology. The existentiali st :framework would 
then become the vehicle for theological expression. But is this 
7Pelikan, From Luther To Kierkegaard, pp. 92, 93. 
8
rbid., pp. 113, 114. 
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possible? Kierkegaard himself said that "an existential system" was 
impossible. If we look to Kierkegaard for a ready-made system we shall. 
be disappointed. In fact, Lutheran theology may not be able to accept 
all his insights uncritically. He, too, has some missing links which 
should not be surprising since he viewed his work as a "corrective." 
Pelikan observes: 
From what has been said here, as well as in our first 
chapter, we can draw the conclusion that the existential 
philosophy of S~ren Kierkegaard performed a great service 
toward a solution of the problem of a philosophy for 
Lutheran theology. The ~any affinities between his point 
of view and Luther's theology suggest that contemporary 
Lutheran theology could do much worse than to look more 
deeply into Kierkegaard for the categories in which to 
articuJ.ate its faith. This is not to say that theology 
can accept him uncritically; for his opposition to 
"systems" and "schools" would make such uncritical accep-
tance a violation of his own ideas. There are several 
blind spots in his thought, notably the individualism 
and subjectivism which have prevented most of his followers 
from articulating an adequate doctrine of the Church. But 
when compared with the other philosophies to which Lutheran 
theology has been linked, Kierkegaard's philosophy has much 
to say to Lutheran theology.9 · 
In chapter four it was pointed out that Kierkegaard and the 
Confessions often agreed in their conclusions, but disagreed in the 
methods used to arrive at an identical conclusion. It appears to 
this writer that Kierkegaard's methodology with its existentialist 
categories could well serve both as a corrective and as a complement 
to current Luthe~an theological methodology. To fail to utilize the 
insights of Kierkegaard where they are in hannony with Scripture and 
9Ibid., p. 118. 
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our Confessions would be Lutheran theology's loss. But what of those 
instances where they seemingly do not agree? 
The Implications of Kierkegaard's View of the Fall. 
To accurately analyze Kierkegaard's position on the Fall it is 
necessary to trace his theological and philosophic development in 
greater detail than was done in chapter three. The distinctions 
Kierkegaard makes will enable us to evaluate his position regarding 
the Fall fairly. 
We must first ask: What is the relationship of the individual 
to the human race? What is· Adam's relationship to humanity? 
Kierkegaard ans,:1ers: 
To explain Adam's sin is therefore to explain original 
sin and no explanation is of any avail which explains 
original sin and does not explain Adam. The deep~st 
reason for this is to be discovered in the essential 
characteristic of human existence, that man is an 
individual and as such is at once himself and the whole 
race, in such wise that the whole race has part in the 
individual, and the individual has part in the whole race. 
If one does not hold fast to this, one either gets into 
the singularity of Pelagianism, Sociniani.sm, or
9 philanthropy, or else falls into the fantastic. a 
One frequent criticism of Kierkegaard is his failure to sense 
the need for community, yet here he emphasizes the corporate nature 
of man's involvement in humanity. Adam was a man and as such is a 
part of the human race. Any explanation of original sin must seriously 
recognize this fact. But 
9as~ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 26. 
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According to traditional conceptions, the difference 
between Adem Is first sin and the first sin of every 
man is this: Adam's sin conditions sinfulness as a 
consequence; the other first sin assumes sinfulness 
as a condition. If that were so, then Adam would 
really be outside the race, and the race did not begin 
with him but had a beginning outside i tself, and this 
runs contrary to every concept.10 
We agree that Kierkegaard has correct ly summarized the tradi-
tional view of the Fall. But the alternative he suggests poses a 
problem even though it may solve the problem of keeping Adam wit~in 
the race. Kierkegaard's position must predicate a state of innocence 
analogous to Adam's of every man, and this is something Lutheran 
theology would be reluctant to admit. But what is this "innocence?" 
For Kierkegaard "innocence is not a perfection one ought to wish 
to recover." Innocence is rather ignorance of the evil.11 This is 
what Adam lost, and in Kierkegaard's opinion man loses this innocence 
with his first sin. How? 
As Adrun lost innocence by guilt, so does every man lose 
it. If it was not by guilt he lost it, neither was it 
innocence he lost; and if he was not innocent before he 
became guilty, he never became guilty •••• 
But only by guilt is innocence lost; every man loses inno-
cence in essentially the same way- that Adam did, and it is 
not in the interest of ethics to represent all men as 
troubled and interested spectators of' guilt·, but not guilty, 
nor is it to the interest of dogmatics to represent al1 
as interested and sympathetic spectators of redemption, but 
not redeemed.12 
lOibid., p. 27. 
11Ibid., p. 34. 
12Ib.d 
-2:....·, pp. 32, 33. 
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It seems that Kierkegaard is saying that it takes our first 
conscious sin to convince us subjectively of our involvement in the 
Fall. So, too, like Adam we bring sin into the world through our sin. 
With the first sin crone sin into the world. Exactly in 
the same way i s this true of every subsequent first sin 
of man, that with it sin comes into t he world. The fact 
t hat it was not t here before Adam' s f i rst sin i s (in 
relation to sin itself) an altogether accidental and 
irrelevant reflecti on which has alt ogether no significance, 
and is no justificat i on for rnaktng Ao.a-r3s sin greater or the first sin of every other man l ess . 
Ki erkegaard points out i n a footnote that the point of his 
reasoni ng here is to "get J\d;;un back into -che human race, exactly 
in the same sense in which every other individual is." This, he 
f urther points out, theologians ought to look after especially in view 
of the Atonement.14 
Objectively·, Kierkegaard acknowledges the reality of inherited 
s i n. His position is clarified by the following: 
It i s quite true that every man can say with profound 
seriousness that he was born in misery and his mother 
conceived him in sin; but really he can only sorrow 
rightly over it when he himself has brought guilt into 
the wor ld and brought all this upon , himself, for it is 
a contradiction to want to sorrow aesthetically over sin-
f'ulness. T'ne only one who innocently sorrowed over ~ 
s i nf'ulness ·was Christ, but He did not sorrow over it 
l3Ibid., p. 28. 
14rbid., p. 30. 
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as a destiny which He must put up with, but He sorrowed 
a s one who freely chose to bear all the sin of the world 
and to suffer its punishment.15 
Kierkegaard views sinfulness as a quantitative thing whereas 
he views the Fall or the first sin as a qualitative thing because 
it alters man's existence and his understanding of it. He, therefore, 
can claim: 
In the for~going I have several times called attention 
to the fact that the vi ew presented in thi s work does not 
deny the prope.gation of sinfulness through generation, 
or in other wor ds that sinfulness has its history in the 
fact of generation; I have only said that sinfulness moves 
by quantitative determi nants, whereas sin comes in ~on-
stantly by the qualitative leap of the individua1.l6 
For Kierkegaard, sin and freedom are transcendent categories. 
Si n entered into man by dread and in turn brought dread vith it. 
Dread for Kierkegaard was the primary category, an alien power vhich 
lays hold on an individual and renders him impotent. It makes him 
fear what he desires and desire what he fears. Hence, the first 
sin always occurs in impotence. It would seem then that man could 
not be held accountable, but he is, and this very disregard of 
accountability is what ensnares him.17 Kierkegaard seeks to guard 
and buttress individual. accountability with his position. 
15rb1d., p. 35. 
16 . 
~., p. 42. 
17Ibid., p. 45, 47. 
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How does this understanding of the qualitative Fall or first 
sin and the subsequent quantitive sinf'ulness affect Kierkegaard's 
view of human freedom? Much, for "freedom, 11 too, is a concept without 
antecedent. Ki~rkegaard asserts that the distinction "between good 
and evil certainly exists for freedom," but always in concrete form. 
This is misunderstood when freedom is made an object of thought. 
No one, he affirms, makes the choice between good and evil without 
being at the moment of choice in either one or the other position.18 
Thus it appears that Kierkegaard's understanding of the Fall and 
its consequences are not as radical a departure from traditional 
Christianity as it at first ~ay have seemed to some. He makes a 
disttnction between the objective significance of the Fall of Adam 
and our subjective apprehension of its significance. On the other 
hand, the Lutheran Confessions do not stress the subjective appre-
hension of the Fall in the same manner. 
Ultimately, both Kierkegaard and the Confessions include all 
men in the category of spiritual impotence apart from God's grace. 
So in spite of a difference of method both Kierkegaard and the 
Confessions reach the same conclusion. 
18:rbid., p. 99. 
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Some Implications for Systematic Theology 
At the beginning of this chapter it was noted thnt the task of 
theology was to describe "the workings of faith" in faith's own 
terms. In the foregoing we have noted how Pelikan viewed Kierkegaard's 
pot ential contribution to Lutheran theological formulation. In the 
pr evious section we observed that Kierkegaard's view of the Fall may 
not be at odds with the Confessions' understanding because of his 
distinction between the objective Fall and our subjective perception 
of our Fall. In view of the foregoing we might be predisposed to 
favor existence categories for systematic theology's descriptive 
t ask. But Kierkegaard himself has observed that an "existential 
system" is impossible. Without a system the systematic theologian's 
work will be confusing at best. Perhaps Lutheran theology needs to 
revise its outlook on systems. Luther himself said: "To have God, 
you see, does not mean to lay hands upon him, or to put Him into 
19 
a purse, or shut him up in a chest" (L.C. I,13). 
What significance does Kierkegaard's methodology and insights 
into "free" will provide for systematic theology. Heinecken observes 
that Kierkegaard's existential categories mean: 
That there shall be an end of the wrong kind of system-
building, precisely: · the end of that to which Luther 
objected. There can be no fixed system of doctrine, 
fixed and formulated for all times. But there must be 
19The Book of Concord, translated and edited by Theodore G. 
Tappert (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press., 1959), p. 366. 
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the perpetuation of tl1ose categori es ~-rhich require the 
i nner transfonnation. How at any gi ven time this shall 
be done cannot be stated in advance. T'nis is the constant 
t ask of systematic theology: to fonnulate the credo for 
today in opposition to alternatives, to do what"'tFie New 
Testament does, to witness to the 11event" which constitutes 
the center of both history and the fulness of time and to 
do it precisely in the tenns of each todey. Kierkegaard 
did it for his dey, and I think we are still a part of 
hi s day.20 
If we accept Heinecken's judgment, the task for . systematic 
theology becomes a challenging one, indeed. Implicit in this chal.lenge 
is the sunnnons to relevance. To be relevant, we need to conmrunicate. 
Here, Kierkegaard can help us with his emphasis on the "how" of 
. . 
Christian faith. Perhaps in the past the "what" of the Christian 
faith has been emphasized in Lutheran theology at the expense of the 
"how." 
Comnrunication of spiritual realities is at best difficult. We 
previously noted that sincere attempt of the Confessions to draw a 
tight distinction between outward performance in achieving "civil 
righteousness" and true inward realization in "spiritual righteous-
ness." Bonhoe.ffer suggests that either these categories are clumsy 
or the distinction cannot be so neatly drawn. 
The first step. must be regarded to start with as an 
external work, which effects the change from one exis-
tence to another. It is a step within everybody's 
capacity, for it lies within the limits of human freedom. 
2~rtin J. Heinecken, The Moment Before God (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 382. 
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I t is an act within the sphere of the natural la..,, (.justitia 
c ivilis) and in that sphere man is free. Although Peter 
cannot achieve his cnm conversion, he can leave his father's 
nets . In the gospels the very first step a man must take 
:.s an act vhich radically affects his whole existence. The 
; man Catholic Church demanded this step as an extraordinary 
,ossibility which only monks could achieve, while the rest 
of the faithful must content themselves with an uncondi-
t i onal submission to the Church and its ordinances. The 
Lutheran conf essions also significantly recognize the first 
st ep. Having dealt effectively with the danger of Pelagianism, 
t hey find it both possible and necessary to leave room for the 
f irst external act which is the essential preliminary to 
faith. This step there takes the form of an invitation to 
come to the Church where the wrd of salvation is proclaimed. 
To take this step it is not necessary to surrender one's 
f r eedom. Come to Church! You can do that of your own free 
will. You can leave your home on a Sunday morning and come 
t o hear the sermon. If you 'Will not, you are of your own 
free will excluding yourself from the place where faith 
i s a possibility. Thus the Lutheran confessions show their 
awar eness of a situation where faith is a possibility, and of 
a situation where it is not. Admittedly they tend to soft-
pedal it as though they were almost ashamed of it. But 
t here it is, and it shows that they are just as aware as 21 the gospels of the importance of the first external step. 
Kierkegaard likewise recognizes the "choice" that Bonhoeffer is 
poi nting up here with his distinction between the religion of immanence 
and paradoxical Christianity. The difference is that he does it 
without apology or any attempt to "soft-pedal" the need for this 
choi ce. The Confessions also had difficulty communicating the nature 
of the "image of God." A "di m spark" is for some a quantitive term. 
I s not man's relationship to God that of a derived and dependent being? 
I s not the image of God more clearly understood when described as 
21Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleshi}, translated by 
R.H. Fuller (New York: The macmillan Company, 1958. p. 57. 
' \ 
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man's reflexive nature received from God by grace, perceived by faith 
and expressed by trust and obedience? Is it not dangerous to speak 
of the "image of God" as something concreated in man as though it were 
his possession? It seems to leave the gate open for pantheistic or 
idealistic deification of man with its imagery of the "Divine Spark." 
If Lutheran theology is to communicate meaningfully, it must 
use categories with which people can relate. As an example contrast 
the two following quotations on the nature of man. 
Man, created by God, is placed in the Garden, and cormna.nded 
"to dress and keep it" (Gen. 2:15). He is given power and 
authorHy over the beasts of the field, but he is solemnly 
forbidden to eat "of the tree of the knowledge or good and 
evil" (Gen. 2:17). Man's powers, according to the Biblical 
r evelation, are conferred and bestowed: they are neither 
absolute nor original. Man's relation to God is one of 
creaturely dependence, in which he enjoys delegated authority; 
and, as a created being, he is called to live in trust and 
obedience. He is called to respond to fatherly goodness 
wit h filial trust: to grace with faith. Consequently, he 
is called to recognize and confess that the true center 
of his life is not within himself but beyond himself. ~he 
Biblical story is the record of the destruction of this 
relationship by willful self-assertion and rebellion. The 
result is man's undoing, and the experience of God's love 
as wrath.22 
This quotation reflects existence categories, whereas the follow-
ing citation uses scholastic terminology. 
The divine image, that is, the true knowledge of God and 
the confonnity of the human will to the will of God, was 
not subsequently and externally added to man at creation, 
as the Papists contend, who regard the divine image 
22stuart Barton Babbage, Man In Nature and In Grace (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), p. 16. 
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(holiness and righteousness) as a donum superadditum, a 
superadded gift . Rather was man created with the divine 
i mage, as Gen. 1:26 shows: "Let us make man in Our image., 
a f'ter Our Likeness." The divine image was a donum 
concreatum, donum naturale., donum intrinsecum-:----ft' follows 
that now, af'ter the Fall, the human nature is no longer 
perfect (natura integra or in puris naturalibus)., as the 
Papists and modern theologians and philosophers teach, but 
thor oughly and in its innennost parts corrupt (natura 
corrunt a , na.tura sauciata). , It is true, the iustitia 
ori ginalis did not constitute the nature of man. Even 
after the Fall, man is still c?/Gpwrr<2s (Rom. 5:12), 
inasmuch a s the original righteousness was not t~~ substance, 
but a non-essential attribute or acc i dent •••• 
The danger impli cit in the scholastic method and tenninology is 
i t s hidden rationali sm. In Lutheran theol ogy we may strive to define 
t he r elationship between the two natures of Christ until at the end 
of t he study of the "Genus Apotelesmatic1l'll 11 we have forgotten the 
mystery and the paradox of the God-man, J esus Christ. 24 Kierkegaard 
noted that once we feel we comprehend something we feel at the same 
time we have mastered it. Subtle, indeed, is the appeal to pride in 
the present framework of Lutheran theology. 
Hei necken opserves: 
Luther ma.de the God-relationshio in Christ a matter of 
Word alone 'Without "objective" guarantees, as., e.g., 
r eason, t he church. This is what Kierkegaard too is 
asserting . It is possible to live in Aristotelian 
categories, it is possible to l i ve in ethical categories, 
but this must not be confused with Christianity.· Both 
Luther and Kierkegaard, therefore, removed Christianity 
from the area of speculation and put it where it belongs, 
23Pieper, Dogmatics, I, 521. 
24 Cf. James 1:23,24. 
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im Sitz des Lebens--in the midst of life--where the 
battles must be fought. Both of them were concerned 
to let God be God, to take seriously the Triune God, 
not to discar d Pentecost, to make sure that a man was 
not li vin~ af!;cr all after the flesh instead of in 
a.ccordo.nce with the Gpiri t, glorying in his own wisdom 
and the feeling that he was a devil of a cleyer fellow 2 to recosnize the true God when he was confronted by him. 5 
If we seek seriously to utilize Kierkegaard's contribution to 
Lutheran theology it will mean that systematic theology will have to 
address itself to the whole man, and not just to man's intellect. 
Systematic theology must confront the whole man with God's claim upon 
him as a creature and God's gift to Him in Christ. Psychiatry today 
is recognizing man's fragmented condition as a cau~e of his spiritual 
dissolution. Paul Tournier in his book, The Whole Person in a Broken 
1-!orld, appeals to the churches to speak w:i. th relevance to man's 
spiritual need. His thesis is that the repressed spiritual conscious-
ness of man today is responsible for the "neurosis of defiance" that 
characterizes our age. He condemns the churches for withdrawing from 
the real battles of life, and one of the methods of this withdrawal 
is the intellectualizing of the Christian f aith.26 
Kierkegaard like Luther leaves behind no completed system. He 
poses problems, a few of which are the ·relation of thought to existence, 
of reason to faith, of nature to grace, of inunanence to transcendence. 
25Heinecken, The Moment Before God, p. 352. 
26Paul To~ier, The vlhole Person in a Broken World, translated by 
John and Helen Doberstein (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1947), 
passim. 
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Can these be viewed as co-ordinates or must they be held in tension? 
Can they be synthesized as they were in Thomistic scholasticism or 
must they, as Luther seems to indicate, remain in irreconcilable 
tension and opposition? But isn't this the business of systematic 
theology.? This study too poses questions and fails to answer them. 
Perhaps it is the destiny of systematic theology always to have more 
questions than answers. The experience of not being able to ansver 
is a humbling one, a reminder that God remains God and that His fool• 
ishness is wiser than our wisdom. 
All who involve themselves in the task of systematic theology 
are also sinners. We too might well pray with Kierkegaard: 
Father in heaven, to Thee the congregation of'ten makes 
its petition for all who are sick and sorrowful, and 
when someone amongst us lies ill, alas of mortal sick-
ness the congregation sometimes desires a special peti-
tion; Grant that we may each one of us become in good 
time aware what sickness it is ,-1hich is the sickness unto 
death, and aware that we are al.l of us suffering from 
this sickness. O Lord Jesus Christ, who didst come to 
earth to heal them that suffer from this sickness, from 
which, alas, we all suffer, but from which Thou are able 
to heal only those who are conscious that they are sick in 
this way; help Thou us in this sickness to hold fast to 
Thee, to the end that we may be healed of it. 0 God the 
Holy Ghost, who comest to help us in this sickness if we 
honestly desire to be healed; remain with us so that for 
no single instant we may to our own destruction shun the 
Physician, but may remain with Him--delivered from sickness. 
For to be with Him is to be delivered from our sickn2,s and 
when we are with Him we are saved from all sickness. 
27s~ren Kierkegaard, Fear And Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, 
transla~ed by Walter Lowrie, Doubleday Anchor Books (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 133, 134. 
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